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POLICY DISTORTION AND DEMOCRATIC 
DEBILITATION: COMPARATIVE 




James Bradley Thayer set the terms of the past century's discus-
sion of judicial review in The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law.1 Thayer was concerned with what 
Alexander Bickel labeled the "countermajoritarian difficulty" with 
judicial review,2 that judicial review displaces decisions made by 
near-contemporaneous political majorities and therefore is open to 
the charge that it is undemocratic. Thayer attempted to minimize 
the displacement- of political majorities through his "clear error" 
rule, according to which courts should not overturn legislation un-
less "those who have the right to make laws have not merely made 
a mistake, but have made a very clear one, - so clear that it is not 
open to rational question."3 The generations that succeeded 
Thayer found that solution unpalatable.4 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, 
M.A. 1971, Yale. - Ed. I would like to thank Paul Gewirtz, Alan Hutchinson, Vicki Jack-
son, Elana Kagan, Dan Kahan, Donald Kommers, Wtlliam Landes, Roderick Macdonald, 
Michael Perry, David Schneiderman, Stephen Schulhofer, Carlos Vasquez, and Paul Weiler 
for their comments on a draft of this article, and Ian Ayres, Alan Schwartz, and Dan Shaviro 
for suggestions about particular lines of argument that I develop. Nona Liegeois and Melissa 
Newman provided valuable research assistance. I received helpful comments from partici-
pants in workshops at Yale Law School, Northwestern University Law School, the University 
of Chicago Center for Comparative Legal History and Law School, and New York University 
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Seegers Lecture, Valparaiso University School of Law, in 1991, and I thank Dean Edward 
McGlynn Gaffney for inviting me to deliver the lecture. 
1. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HAR.v. L. REv. 129 (1893). See generally Symposium, One Hundred Years of 
Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1993). 
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF Pouncs 16-17 (1962). 
3. Thayer, supra note 1, at 144. 
4. Among contemporary constitutional theorists, almost no one accepts Thayer's 
minimalism across-the-board. Henry Monaghan may be the sole exception. See Henry P. 
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). A broad generalization, 
inaccurate only at the margins, is that nearly every constitutional theorist urges minimal judi-
cial review and vigorous democratic dialogue on issues on which the theorist believes her 
preferred position is likely to prevail in the democratic dialogue and more-than-minimal re-
view on issues on which the theorist believes her preferred position is unlikely to prevail 
245 
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Instead of reducing judicial review to Thayer's minimal level,s 
scholars have attempted to work around the countermajoritarian 
difficulty by identifying a domain in which more-than-minimal judi-
cial review is compatible with democratic theory. Some originalists 
conclude from their examination of the relevant materials that 
more-than-minimal judicial review is sometimes justified because 
judicial enforcement of the Constitution's original meaning carries 
out the only agreement binding the people's representatives.6 
Process-oriented theorists argue that such review is justified when 
the majoritarian deficit associated with judicial review is smaller 
than the majoritarian deficit associated with other decisional 
processes.7 The variations on these themes have preoccupied con-
stitutional theorists in the United States for generations.8 Even 
Bickel's emphasis on justiciability doctrines as a way of reducing 
the occasions for judicial review was designed to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the Court's actions when it did exercise more-than-
minimal review. 
Perhaps democratic theory does allow for some displacement of 
near-contemporary majority views. Both Thayer and Bickel, how-
there. For dramatic illustrations from two of the best, see CASS R. SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION (1993), especially at 315-17 (arguing that courts should require governments 
to fund abortions, at least in cases of rape and incest) and 228-30 (arguing that courts should 
not restrict government regulation of campaign finance), and Michael W. McConnell, The 
Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989 (1991) 
(arguing that courts should require governments to assist parents with tuition charged by 
religious schools and that courts should not require governments to assist in paying for 
abortions). 
5. I take the term "minimalist" from Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and 
the Question of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 84 (1993). 
6. That is, the justification for making originalist materials authoritative is that doing so 
carries out the agreement. For another band of originalists, originalism is justified, not be-
cause it is compatible with democracy, but because it is the only account of constitutionalism 
that is compatible with the proposition that the Constitution is law. For myself, I find this 
definitional "justification" of originalism normatively unsatisfying; justifying originalism as 
compatible with democracy, in contrast, has what I regard as the appropriate form. 
7. This formulation is designed to take into account Charles Black's important but widely 
overlooked point that we ought to distinguish between judicial decisions overturning statutes, 
for example, a statute specifically authorizing searches of automobile junkyards on less-than-
probable cause, and judicial decisions overturning specific decisions made by officeholders, 
for example, a search of an automobile junkyard on less-than-probable cause by an individ-
ual police officer acting solely under her general authority to investigate the possibility that 
some crime has been committed. See CHA.ru.Es L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATION· 
SHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77-93 (1969). A court's relative majoritarian deficit is surely 
larger in the first than in the second situation, and - perhaps - an individual police officer 
may have less majoritarian legitimacy than a court. 
8. I do not exempt myself from this observation, although I believe that my critical ap-
proach did not force me to engage in a normative defense of any particular version of the 
allocational strategy I describe. See MARK TusHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CruncAL 
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). But see PmuP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL IN· 
TERPRETATION 126-40 (1991) (characterizing my approach as prudentialist). 
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ever, were concerned with other costs associated with more-than-
minimal judicial review. Judicial review, according to Thayer, "has 
had a tendency to drive out questions of justice and right, and to fill 
the mind[ s] of legislators with thoughts of mere legality . . . . And 
moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have felt little respon-
sibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it."9 Not 
only would judicial review displace majoritarian decisionmaking; it 
might also distort and debilitate it. First, judicial review might dis-
tort decisionmaking by injecting too many constitutional norms into 
the lawmaking process, supplanting legislative consideration of 
other arguably more important matters. Second, judicial review 
might debilitate decisionmaking by leading legislatures to enact 
laws without regard to constitutional considerations, counting on 
the courts to strike from the statute books those laws that violate 
the Constitution, leading to the problem of debilitation. 
Looked at from one point of view, these problems are in some 
tension. The problem of policy distortion arises when legislators 
take what the courts say about the Constitution's meaning too seri-
ously, and the problem of democratic debilitation arises when legis-
lators and their constituents do not take the Constitution's meaning 
- or more precisely, their own views about that meaning - seri-
ously enough. The problems would be troublesome if one occurred 
with respect to some issues and the other with respect to other is-
sues or at other times. A legislator may fail to give enough weight 
to constitutional concerns about welfare reform but may give too 
much weight to the Supreme Court's constitutional pronounce-
ments when considering whether to enact a statute about the distri-
bution of sexually explicit materials over the information 
superhighway. But, precisely because legislative views about the 
Constitution's meaning may differ from the courts', the problems of 
distortion and debilitation may sometimes occur simultaneously.10 
9. Thayer, supra note 1, at 155-56. 
10. I simply note here a question about what might be called the Constitution's ontologi-
cal status. The analysis that follows is agnostic about whether in some deep sense the Consti-
tution "has" a meaning. Its premise is that, however one answers that question, the only 
meanings anyone can identify are articulated by people with specific and differing interests 
and incentives. In particular, in addition to discussing judicially and legislatively articulated 
constitutional norms, a full analysis would at least occasionally advert to academically articu-
lated constitutional norms, with some discussion of how the incentives of academic commen-
tators affect the norms they articulate. For a brief discussion of those incentives, see Daniel 
A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 10 MINN. L. REV. 917 {1986). See also Martin Sha-
piro & Alec Stone, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 CoMP. PoL. Sruo. 397, 415 
{1994) (noting the need for additional study of the impact of constitutional law professors, 
including the impact from testimony in parliamentary proceedings or advising political 
parties). 
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For Thayer, distortion and debilitation were independent argu-
ments against more-than-minimal judicial review. Even if such re-
view did not pose a problem of democratic displacement, the 
problems of policy distortion and democratic debilitation resulting 
from more-than-minimal review might still be so severe that the na-
tion's constitutional order would be better without such review than 
with it. 
Thayer believed that his minimalist theory of judicial review ad-
dressed all three problems. By eliminating the problem of displace-
ment of democratic decisions, it would eliminate the problem of 
distortion because there would be no judicially articulated constitu-
tional norms to intrude into legislative deliberations. Moreover, if 
all worked well, it would simultaneously eliminate the problem of 
debilitation by inducing the public to insist that their representa-
tives take constitutional considerations into account because no one 
else would. 
If Thayer was right,11 proponents of more-than-minimal judicial 
review in any of its versions must deal with the problems of policy 
11. To the extent that modem constitutional scholarship deals with the issues discussed 
here, it tends to reject the claim that the problem of democratic debilitation is a serious one. 
That rejection takes two forms. First, some argue that, contrary to Thayer, today's political 
discourse is overly concerned with constitutional concerns: according to these critics, consti-
tutional concerns associated with the vigorous assertion of individual rights have taken over 
territory that pure policy concerns or concerns about individual and social responsibility 
ought to occupy. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHI'S TALK; THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). To some extent, my discussion of policy distortion is designed 
to identify precisely what is wrong with that sort of constitutional discourse. Elsewhere Louis 
Michael Seidman and I contest that description of contemporary political discourse, arguing 
that the language of constitutional rights, though widely used, is an empty vessel into which 
people pour their antecedent policy and moral views. See Louis M. SEIDMAN & MARK V. 
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (forthcoming 
1996). The Constitution, we argue, does no independent work in political discourse. My 
view, though not necessarily Seidman's, is that the latter phenomenon is widespread and 
constitutes a form of democratic debilitation in that constitutional norms play no independ-
ent role in deliberation. 
Others argue that more-than-minimal judicial review contributes to a vigorous dialogue 
with and among the public about constitutional norms. I believe that this dialogic conception 
fails to distinguish two different aspects of the interaction between the courts and the public. 
The first description accurately points out that the process of constitutional development 
occurs over time, with interventions by the courts, responses by the public, additional inter-
ventions by the courts sometimes influenced by the public response to the first intervention, 
and so on. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 
(1993). To counter Thayer's concerns, however, the public responses would have to be "con-
stitutional," that is, cast in terms of the values embedded in the Constitution. One might 
contrast here the "dialogues" between the Court and the public with respect to abortion after 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and with respect to capital punishment after Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). My judgment is 
that the abortion debate has been constitutional in a way that the capital punishment debate 
has not. 
Both forms of the claim that democratic debilitation due to more-than-minimal judicial 
review is not a problem raise empirical questions. See also infra note 204. 
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distortion and democratic debilitation.12 Thayer did little to eluci-
date those problems. With the spread of constitutional review 
throughout the world, we now have a larger base of information on 
which to rest judgments about the nature and scope of those 
problems.13 For example, what exactly is the problem of policy dis-
tortion, and does minimal judicial review eliminate it? If more-
than-minimal judicial review is both required by democratic theory 
and associated with the problem of democratic debilitation, are 
there additional institutional arrangements that can reduce demo-
cratic debilitation?14 
In this article, I explore these questions by relying on recent 
constitutional experience in France and Canada. Their experience 
helps illuminate the problems of U.S. constitutional law that Thayer 
and Bickel posed for us. Part I uses a recent study of the French 
Constitutional Council to examine the problem of policy distortion. 
Most of Part I is concerned with identifying the problem of policy 
distortion more precisely than Thayer did. It concludes with a brief 
suggestion that minimal judicial review might not be a full solution 
to that problem. Part II turns to the Canadian experience with sec-
12. The problem of democratic displacement has been the focus of most scholarly criti-
cism of more-than-minimal judicial review. For my contributions, see the increasingly quali-
fied sequence of articles: Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363 (1984); 
Mark Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal Political Theory, 17 Por.. & SoCY. 403 (1989); 
Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 41 SMU L. REv. 23 (1993). A parallel critical litera-
ture exists on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See, e.g., ALLAN HUTCHINSON, 
WAITING FOR CORAF: A CrunouE OF LAw AND RIGHTS (1995); MrcHAEL MANDEL, THE 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGAUZATION OF Pouncs IN CANADA (1989). 
13. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which -
though different from ours in many particulars - unmistakably draw their origin and 
inspiration from American constitutional theory and practice. These countries are our 
"constitutional offspring" and how they have dealt with the problems analogous to ours 
can be very useful to us when we face difficult constitutional issues. Wise parents do not 
hesitate to learn from their children. 
56 F.3d at 469 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
I have tried to heed the usual cautions about the dangers of comparative study by asking 
here only whether experience elsewhere can illuminate Thayer's and Bickel's arguments. 
One should be cautious about drawing strong lessons from experiences elsewhere because 
the outcomes in other societies may be tightly tied to the specifics of their cultures or may 
result from structural factors other than the constitutional structures to which this article pays 
attention. 
14. This question is not here presented in a form parallel to the question I raise about the 
problem of policy distortion. I present the question in this way because of my view that it 
would be desirable for constitutional consciousness - and even authority - to be distrib-
uted more broadly than it is now. To some extent that view in tum rests on a notion of the 
proper role of what Richard Parker calls "political energy" in a good democracy. See 
RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RuLE": A CONSTITUTIONAL PoPUUST MANI. 
FESTO 55-56 (1994). To some extent, it rests on a probably romantic belief that the public 
policies that would be enacted were constitutional authority more broadly distributed would 
be more compatible with my own political views. 
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tion 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the so-
called notwithstanding clause. U.S. scholars have suggested that 
the notwithstanding clause is an ingenious institutional arrange-
ment that allows more-than-minimal judicial review to coexist with 
a vigorous majoritarian politics. Closer examination of the Cana-
dian experience suggests that it is not. Part II goes on to explore 
the reasons for section 33's failure and speculates on the practicabil-
ity of the Canadian approach to this problem of democratic 
debilitation generally. In conclusion, I suggest that, even as speci-
fied, the problems of policy distortion and democratic debilitation 
may be serious enough to confirm Thayer's initial sense that more-
than-minimal judicial review poses difficult problems for the opera-
tion of a stable and vigorous constitutional democracy. 
I. THE FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL AND THE PROBLEM 
OF POLICY DISTORTION 
Policy distortion occurs when, due to judicial review, legislators 
choose policies that are less effective but more easily defensible 
than other constitutionally acceptable alternatives. Political scien-
tist Alec Stone's analysis of the French Constitutional Council fo-
cuses on this problem.15 According to Stone, the Council's power 
to articulate constitutional norms "alter[ s] legislative outcomes" 
through its "pedagogical authority" and "the threat of future Coun-
cil censure."16 Legislators sacrifice their policy goals "to insulate a 
bill from possible future Council censure."17 Stone is not particu-
larly concerned about the normative implications of this effect, 
which he calls "juridicization."18 Others, following Thayer's lead, 
may think that juridicization is indeed a problem because the soci-
ety is regulated by rules that its legislators would in some sense 
prefer to be otherwise. Specifying that sense, however, is quite dif-
ficult. My aim in this Part is primarily to clarify the notion of policy 
distortion and, by identifying a set of categories that might be help-
15. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CoUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1992). 
16. Id. at 119. 
17. Id. at 122. 
18. Id. at 7. Stone properly calls the term "awkward[]." Id. Other political scientists 
have used cognate terms, particularly juridification and judicialization, to refer to the phe-
nomenon Stone discusses, as well as other phenomena. See, e.g., Special Issue, The Judicial-
ization of Politics, 15 INTL. PoL. Sci. REv. 91 (1994). The broader terms sometimes refer (a) 
to the displacement of issues previously confined to political fora into the judicial arena -
this displacement is connected to the problem of democratic debilitation - or (b) to the use 
of judicial-type procedures in decisionmaking settings that previously had used less formal 
procedures. 
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fu1 for those who wish to address the problem of policy distortion, 
to examine when it might occur and whether and why it might be 
troublesome. 
Section A lays out the basic structure of the French system of 
constitutional review and provides two examples in which policy 
distortion might have occurred as a result of that system. Section B 
addresses the problem raised by the examples in section A: What is 
the difference between policy distortion resulting from judicial re-
view and proper enforcement by the courts of proper constitutional 
limits? By looking at the general role-allocation regime in which 
legislators have no role in articulating constitutional norms and the 
limited role-allocation regime in which legislators do not have to 
observe substantive constitutional limits within limited domains, 
this section concludes that in order for policy distortion to occur, 
legislators must be allowed to articulate constitutional norms that 
differ from those identified by the courts. Section C then goes on to 
explore when and how policy distortions might occur and analyzes 
approaches to the problem other than minimal judicial review. 
A. The Structure of Constitutional Review in France 
The French Constitutional Council was created in the Gaullist 
constitution of 1958. Designed primarily to ensure that Parliament 
would not trench on the important powers the 1958 constitution 
gave the President, the Council is an expressly political body. It has 
nine members who serve nine-year nonrenewable terms. The Presi-
dent of France, the President of the Senate, and the President of the 
National Assembly each name three members.19 Politicians, partic-
ularly former ministers, have dominated the Council. In 1986, for 
example, eight of the Council's nine members had been ministers.20 
The Council exercises what scholars of comparative constitu-
tional law call abstract and a priori judicial review, in contrast to the 
U.S. system of concrete and a posteriori review.21 The Council re-
views laws after their adoption by parliament but before their offi-
cial promulgation. This review is abstract because it does not occur 
in the context of a litigated case whose facts might illuminate the 
constitutional issue, and it is a priori because it occurs before the 
19. Former presidents of France are members of the Council for life. Only two former 
presidents have served, the last in 1962, and, according to Stone, "it is likely that they will be 
the last to do so." STONE, supra note 15, at 50. 
20. Id. 
21. In addition, the French system centralizes constitutional review in a single specialized 
court, whereas the U.S. system authorizes every court to consider constitutional questions. 
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laws go into effect. The nation's leading political figures - the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the branches of 
Parliament - may invoke judicial review by referring laws to the 
Council, as may sixty members of either branch of Parliament. 
Stone offers two detailed case studies of the French system of 
constitutional review. These examples bring the "policy distortion" 
effect of constitutional review into a clearer light. In 1981, the 
newly elected Socialist government confronted a Council domi-
nated by Gaullist appointees, a majority of whom had been elected 
politicians.22 Among the government's primary proposals was an 
extensive nationalization of the economy, which the conservatives 
unsurprisingly resisted.23 On January 16, 1982, the Council held 
that major aspects of the Socialist nationalization program violated 
a constitutional principle embedded in the 1789 Declaration of 
Rights of Man against taking property without just compensation. 
The government had proposed a complex compensation formula in 
which stock prices accounted for only fifty percent of the compen-
sation for nationalized property.24 The Council held, however, that 
compensation had to be based on stock prices "evaluated on the 
day of the property transfer, taking into account the influence 
which the prospect of the nationalization might have had on the 
value of their shares. "25 In response to this decision, the Socialist 
government modified the nationalization program by increasing the 
compensation offered by approximately thirty percent,26 paying for 
it through a tax increase that was inconsistent with the govern-
ment's general program of economic stimulation. Stone concludes 
that "[n]o stockholder who has ever been bought out by a modem, 
industrial state . . . has ever enjoyed terms as good as those in 
France in 1982. "27 
Stone also examines a second key element of the Socialist pro-
gram, a press law aimed at breaking up media monopolies, particu-
larly the one owned by the conservative and former Nazi 
22. STONE, supra note 15, at 80. The analogy to the situation President Thomas Jefferson 
faced in 1801 is irresistible. 
23. Stone quotes one source that noted that "the Right had begun to hail the Council as 
'the last rampart against the socialist-communist government.' " Id. at 79. 
24. Average share prices from 1978 to 1980 were 50% of the compensation; the remain-
der was divided equally between average net profits for the period multiplied by 10 and net 
accounting assets as of December 31, 1981. Id. at 150. 
25. Id. at 161. 
26. The new formula was based on the highest monthly average stock price between Oc-
tpber 1980 and March 1981 - which in Stone's terms "discount(ed] for the effect of the 
Left's victory on prices," id. at 163, and two additional supplements. 
27. Id. at 165. 
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collaborator Robert Hersant, and at preventing such monopolies 
from re-forming in the futirre.28 The government's bill would have 
allowed one person or group to own or control no more than a 
single national daily newspaper or fifteen percent of a regional mar-
ket; further, the bill would have guaranteed the independence of 
the editorial staff from the publisher. In addition, the government 
proposed to create an agency to regulate acquisitions, which could 
both suspend and nullify sales of publications. 
The political battle over the bill was intense. Fearing that the 
Constitutional Council would invalidate the bill, legislators seized 
control of it and forced its modification. For example, under the 
final bill, individuals or groups could control "several dailies" so 
long as their combined market share did not exceed fifteen percent, 
and the regulatory agency could neither suspe~d sales nor directly 
dismantle merged enterprises. In considering changes to the bill, 
legislators referred to prior Council decisions indicating that some 
constitutional rights could not be subject to a requirement of prior 
authorization.w 
Despite the legislators' efforts, when the proposed law reached 
the Constitutional Council, it "upheld the government's legislation 
in principle but not in detail."30 In particular, the Council immu-
nized existing media groups, including Hersant's, from the applica-
tion of the new law.31 The Council also held that market-share 
ceilings were constitutional only as applied to future acquisitions 
and not if the market share of existing or newly created publica-
tions associated with a group exceeded the fifteen percent ceiling. 
In addition, the Council concluded that the regulatory agency 
would in effect impose a system of prior authorization for the exer-
cise of press freedom, which made its operation unconstitutional. 
It seems clear that the Constitutional Council thwarted the en-
actment of two major pieces in the Socialist legislative agenda and 
that the legislation that emerged from the total process was differ-
ent from the laws the Socialists had hoped to enact. Yet, the Coun-
cil purported to invoke constitutional norms of private property, 
just compensation, and free expression. Stone gives the label 
auto/imitation to "the government's exercise of legislative self-
28. Id. at 178·83 (discussing the 1984 Press Law, Debars, National Assembly (Con-
stituante), 12 Sept. 1984, at 4431-33). 
29. See STONE, supra note 15, at 184. 
30. Id. at 84. 
31. According to Stone, Hersant ignored the new law, and, by March 1986, he controlled 
over 38% of the national market for daily newspapers. Id. at 190. 
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restraint resulting from anticipation of a referral to, and an eventual 
negative decision of, the Constitutional Council."32 More conven-
tionally, though, the phenomenon might have been called constitu-
tional limitation. 
It is difficult, however, to see that this limitation necessarily re-
sults in a policy distortion for transition. Unless one simply dis-
agrees with the Council's constitutional interpretation, in what 
sense was the result a distortion of legislative policy, rather than the 
enactment of policies consistent with the constitution's require-
ments? By specifically distinguishing between actions taken with a 
view toward limitations imposed by the constitution and actions 
taken with a view toward limitations imposed by the Constitutional 
Council in the name of the constitution, Stone allows us to examine 
the problem of policy distortion in more detail. 
B. Specifying the Nature of Policy Distortion 
That it is not obviously a distortion of policy to ensure that pol-
icy be consistent with the Constitution is the first puzzle to solve. 
Two other puzzles also deserve attention. Suppose judicial efforts 
to enforce constitutional norms distort policymaking. In the United 
States, legislators take an oath to uphold the Constitution. When 
they attempt to enforce constitutional norms, pursuant to one un-
derstanding of their oath, do legislators also distort policymaking? 
Once again, the sense in which attempting to enforce constitutional 
norms distorts policy requires clarification. One candidate is that 
the constitutional tribunal's decisions are not themselves "what the 
Constitution requires."33 Yet, if so, where does "the Constitution" 
that is said to distort policymaking come from? An investigation 
into these puzzles reveals that policy distortion may occur only 
when legislators are allowed to consider constitutional norms in 
shaping policy and when the norms they identify are different from 
those laid down by the courts. 
1. Role Allocation and the Puzzle of the Oath 
Consider a constitutional system with a rigid allocation of roles: 
legislators are directed to respond solely to their judgments about 
what sound social policy requires - or to their constituents' de-
mands - where soundness has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
32. Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted). 
33. In the tenns of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution itself and not 
necessarily the Supreme Court's decisions is "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2; see infra text accompanying notes 34-52. 
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policies embedded in the constitution; judges are directed to re-
spond solely to their judgments about what the constitution re-
quires. Such a system might be defended on grounds of 
comparative advantage. Legislators, though not entirely incompe-
tent at constitutional analysis, are sufficiently less competent than 
judges that the best set of policies will result from this rigid role 
allocation. In such a system, policy might be distorted when legisla-
tors inject considerations of constitutionality, which are irrelevant 
to their role, into their policy deliberations. 
The oath U.S. legislators take to support the Constitution 
strongly suggests, though, that ours is not such a system.34 True, 
one might argue that a legislator upholds the Constitution when she 
acts consistently with the rigid demands of the role-allocation sys-
tem, even though her role requires that she not take any specific 
constitutional provision into account while she deliberates. It 
would be peculiar, however, to ask such a legislator to take an oath 
to uphold the Constitution. The role-allocation system directs legis-
lators to take into account only matters of policy a:nd politics. 
These considerations are what a legislator would take into account 
even without a constitutional oath. 
Even if such a general role-allocation regime were in place, it is 
difficult to see how the institution of constitutional review could 
distort legislative policy. First, in such a system the courts would be 
the only body permitted to.find the substantive policy limits embed-
ded in the Constitution. Therefore the courts' interpretation of the 
Constitution would necessarily be "what the Constitution re-
quires. "35 As such, any limits the courts could place on the legisla-
ture's policy decisions would not be distortions but would simply be 
indications of proper constitutional limits. Second, if legislators in 
such a system improperly considered constitutional norms while 
forming policies, it would not be the institution of constitutional 
review that would work improper policy distortions but rather the 
34. See Alec Stone, Judging Socialist Reform: The Politics of Coordinate Construction in 
France and Germany, 26 CoMP. Pm_ STUD. 443, 463 (1994) ("In France, deputies and sena-
tors are required to behave as constitutional judges whenever a motion of unconstitutionality 
is raised;" the standing rules of both houses provide for such motions). According to Stone, 
"During these debates, legislators cite constitutional provisions, original intent, past Council 
decisions, and the work of respected law professors." Id. 
35. This must be so because under such a system, there is no other body capable of giving 
the Constitution meaning. The legislative body might be able to amend the Constitution and 
add to it, but they would not be allowed to find meaning in the existing Constitution. 
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improper actions of legislators.36 Thus, under a general role-alloca-
tion regime, policy distortion as a result of constitutional review 
could not exist. 
2. Political Questions and the Puzzle of "the Constitution" 
Treating the Constitution as a document that creates only a 
structure of incentives for legislators37 is unsatisfactory as a general 
account of the U.S. constitutional system and as a basis for an ex-
planation of the problem of policy distortion. Such an approach, 
however, might retain some force in our system of constitutional 
review within limited domains where legislators need not take the 
Constitution into account. If they did take the Constitution into 
account when making policy in those areas, the legislative product 
might be distorted. Even this restricted role-allocation account has 
serious difficulties. In particular, it will prove hard to identify "the 
Constitution" that legislators might take into account in a way that 
could distort the laws they enact. 
An examination of Supreme Court decisions regarding federal-
ism and the political question doctrine, areas in which an approach 
akin to limited role allocation is used, is instructive. According to 
Justice Blackmun, "The political process ensures that laws that un-
duly burden the States will not be promulgated" because of the 
"built-in restraints that our system provides through state participa-
tion in federal governmental action."38 This account of federalism 
is hotly contested and may not represent the Court's current posi-
tion.39 For present purposes, however, its interest lies in its account 
of the responsibility of members of Congress. Under Blackmun's 
version of federalism, members of Congress considering legislation 
that might affect the states uphold the Constitution when they re-
spond to normal political pressures.40 They need not explicitly con-
36. Under the constitutional demands of the general role-allocation system, legislators 
considering constitutional norms would not only be acting improperly by considering consti-
tutional norms but also unconstitutionally. 
37. Elsewhere I distinguish between a constitution of substance and a constitution of 
structure or incentives. See Mark Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Questions, 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996)(book review). A legislator who believed that the 
Constitution was only one of structure might take an oath to uphold the Constitution; in 
doing so, she would be swearing to act in response to the incentives the Constitution creates, 
which is what the legislator would do even without the oath. 
38. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). 
39. See New York v. United States, 504 U.S. 144 (1992). 
40. Elsewhere I call this a structural view of the Constitution as seen from the legislature 
and distinguish it from a substantive view, according to which members of Congress have a 
constitutional duty to respond to some normative vision of federalism embedded in the Con-
stitution. Tushnet, supra note 37 (manuscript at 3). 
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sider whether the proposal is consistent with some normative 
version of federalism. 
One might describe the political question doctrine in similar 
terms.41 Consider first a question reserved in Powell v. McCor-
mack. 42 The Court held that it had the power to consider whether 
the House of Representatives could exclude a person on grounds 
other than the person's failure to satisfy one of the three so-called 
standing qualifications - age, citizenship, and residency - enu-
merated in Article I, Section 2.43 It "express[ed] no view" on the 
question of whether the courts "might still be barred by the political 
question doctrine from reviewing the House's factual determination 
that a member did not meet one of the standing qualifications."44 If 
the doctrine did bar the courts from such considerations, one rea-
son would be that the political constraints on irresponsible fact-
finding are so strong that the risk to constitutional values posed by 
invoking the doctrine is smaller than the risks that attend on judi-
cial review of the House's factual determinations. 
The Justices were divided over this analysis when they revisited 
the political question doctrine in Nixon v. United States. 45 In that 
case, Judge Nixon challenged the process by which the Senate had 
tried his impeachment. He contended that, by delegating large 
parts of the process to a committee, the Senate had failed to accord 
him the trial to which the Constitution entitled him. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion holding that Nixon's claim 
was nonjusticiable. In separate opinions concurring in the judg-
ment, Justices White and Souter expressed concern about the scope 
of that holding. Each raised what Justice Stevens in his concurrence 
called "improbable hypotheticals"46 to challenge the Court's hold-
ing: Could the Senate, "without any procedure whatsoever," im-
peach a judge for "being a 'bad guy' ";47 could it decide based 
"upon a coin-toss"?48 
41. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvmw AND THE NATIONAL PounCAL PRo-
CESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT {1980). 
Choper's "Federalism Proposal," id. at 175-76, has widely been described as seeking to make 
federalism questions nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Con-
stitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1205 (1991). 
42. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
44. 395 U.S. at 521 n.42. 
45. 113 s. Ct. 732 (1993). 
46. 113 S. Ct. at 740 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
47. 113 S. Ct. at 741 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
48. 113 S. Ct. at 748 {Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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If taken seriously, the Court's holding is indeed that impeach-
ments based on coin tosses are unreviewable, even for failure to 
hold the constitutionally mandated trial.49 In response to Judge 
Nixon's argument that "judicial review is necessary in order to 
place a check on the Legislature,"50 Chief Justice Rehnquist men-
tioned "two constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check": 
the impeachment power is shared with the House, and a two-thirds 
majority vote to convict is required.51 The Chief Justice did not 
make the point in precisely this way, but one interpretation of the 
argument here is that the political safeguards are sufficient to en-
sure that the improbable hypotheticals will never come to pass.52 
The federalism and political questions analysis suggests that 
there are circumstances in which a legislator might indeed uphold 
the Constitution while acting solely in response to ordinary policy 
and political concerns. Nonetheless, the analysis conceals a serious 
problem: it deprives us of the language of constitutionalism even as 
it purports to invoke the Constitution. 
Take, for example, Justice Blackmun's view that the political 
safeguards of federalism mean that Congress will not enact laws 
that "unduly burden" the states. This formulation presumably in-
vokes some normative vision of federalism, according to which the 
states ought not to be unduly burdened. Where, though, does that 
normative vision come from? Not from Congress, because on the 
role-allocation account, members of Congress need not have any 
normative vision of federalism in mind when they act. Not from the 
Court, either, because under this analysis, the Court refrains from 
expressing any normative vision. 
Thus, the limited role-allocation explanation for policy distor-
tion fails for the exact opposite reason than the one for which the 
general role-allocation explanation fails. Under the general role-
allocation regime, there can be no policy distortion because only 
courts are allowed to speak to the substantive limits of the Consti-
tution.53 Under the limited role-allocation system, however, there 
49. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is opaque enough, however, that it might not re-
quire that conclusion. Some passages in his opinion suggest that Judge Nixon got the trial to 
which he was entitled. 113 S. a. at 736 ("(P]recise" limitations in the Impeachment Trial 
Clause "suggest[ ] that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the 
form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the word 'try' in the first sentence."). 
50. 113 s. a. at 739. 
51. 113 S. a. at 739. 
52. Note, however, that the House's participation will have ended when the Senate de-
cides by coin toss. 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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can be no policy distortion because no body may speak to the sub-
stantive limits of the Constitution. Because it lacks a normative vi-
sion of what the Constitution requires, that system has no 
possibility of constitutional review that could result in policy 
distortions. 
In sum, policy distortion can only occur when legislators may 
take constitutional norms into account and when those norms are 
not necessarily identical to the ones the courts lay down. That legis-
lators must be allowed to consider constitutional norms takes ac-
count of the problems exposed by the analysis of the general and 
restricted role-allocation descriptions of legislators' roles. That the 
norms considered by the legislature differ from those identified by 
the courts deals with the restricted role-allocation description and 
the first puzzle, that of distinguishing between compliance with the 
Constitution and the development of a distorted policy in light of 
judicial review. Having established the necessary preconditions for 
the occurrences of policy distortions as a result of constitutional re-
view, a further question must be addressed: What types of situa-
tions will lead to policy distortions in a system in which they might 
occur? 
C. Judicially and Legislatively Articulated Constitutional Norms 
Intuitively, the problem of policy distortion arises when the 
courts, exercising the power of judicial review, say something about 
what the Constitution requires, and legislators somehow improperly 
take what the courts have said into account as they shape policy. 
So, for example, Stone writes of the French Parliament's restructur-
ing of the nationalization law to make the compensation formula fit 
the Constitutional Council's requirements. 
In a first cut at the analysis, I have argued that such responsive-
ness can be problematic only if the Council's articulation of consti-
tutional requirements is itself questionable.54 Nothing interesting 
follows, however, if the questions merely express disagreement with 
the merits of the Council's decision. In contrast, if we distinguish 
between judicially articulated constitutional norms and legislatively 
articulated ones and refuse to treat the judicially articulated norms 
as normatively superior to the legislatively articulated ones,55 inter-
esting perspectives on the problem of policy distortion open up. 
54. For a second cut at the analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 100-10. 
55. The analysis becomes more complex if we treat the judicially articulated norms as 
pragmatically but not normatively superior to the legislatively articulated ones. 
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Recall that neither the general nor the restricted role-allocation 
description of the legislator's role, in which legislators do not articu-
late constitutional norms, helps make sense of the notion of policy 
distortion. If, however, legislators articulate constitutional norms 
different from those articulated by judges, we can make sense of the 
idea of policy distortion. Policy distortion would occur, on this ac-
count, when legislators who would otherwise articulate their own 
constitutional norms instead choose to follow the norms the courts 
articulate. 
Further, if legislators may articulate constitutional norms, there 
are good reasons to think that the norms they articulate will be dif-
ferent from the ones judges articulate. Although we have no good 
explanations of how the incentives judges face affect the norms they 
articulate,56 we do know that the mix of incentives faced by judges 
and legislators differ to the extent that legislators' incentives to re-
spond to current electoral concerns are likely to be somewhat 
greater than the parallel incentives on federal judges appointed to 
life terms or, in France, members of the Constitutional Council 
serving nonrenewable terms.57 On the margin, then, the norms a 
legislator articulates will be different from those a judge articulates. 
The following sections explore the implications of distinguishing 
between judicially articulated constitutional norms and legislatively 
articulated ones. 
1. When Legislators Ignore Judicially Articulated 
Constitutional Norms 
If legislators ignore judicially articulated constitutional norms,ss 
the resulting policy could not be distorted by the existence of such 
norms and therefore by the existence of judicial review, in any in-
56. A good summary of standard accounts is Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self· 
Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 648 (1994) 
("[J]udges' desire to improve their working environment ... to increase their prestige and 
influence, or to enhance their reputation."). In this list, reputation is something like a black 
box without what would seem to me a necessary account of how judges' reputations are built, 
which, as I see it, is likely to be a highly politicized account: any result a judge arrives at can 
be "explained" by seeing it as the result of an effort to enhance her reputation. See also 
RICHARD POSNER, What Do Judges Maximize?, in OVERCOMING LAW 109 (1995). 
57. I do not believe that judges' incentives to respond to current electoral concerns are 
nonexistent To use only the U.S. example, federal judges will have been appointed by a 
politicized process, with "sponsors" in the executive and legislative branches. Those sponsors 
or their political successors are likely to have current political interests, and a judge may want 
to preserve her reputation among that group by reaching results consistent with its current 
political interests. 
58. Or if there are no judicially articulated norms, as in cases involving nonjusticiable 
norms or as would be true if the courts used minimal judicial review with respect to the 
subject of the legislation being considered. 
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teresting sense.59 The legislature will simply adopt whatever policy 
it prefers - including a policy influenced by its own understanding 
of the Constitution, whether that would be the courts' understand-
ing or not - and the courts will either allow that policy to go into 
effect or not.60 
Further distinctions bring this conclusion into clearer light. Ju-
dicial articulations of constitutional norms will fall into three cate-
gories. Sometimes the courts' articulation will be so unclear as to 
be effectively useless. At other times, the judicially articulated 
norm is clear enough, and the legislature will easily be able to eval-
uate policies against existing judicial doctrine.61 Finally, there are 
times when judicially articulated norms are not clear enough to jus-
tify firm predictions about the likely outcome of litigation concern-
ing the constitutionality of the legislative output; as I will put it, the 
legislature's position is fairly litigable. In all of these situations, pol-
icy distortion cannot occur if the legislature ignores judicially ar-
ticulated norms. 
a. Unclear Judicial Norms. Consider here the question of feder-
alism and health care reform. Nearly every health care reform plan 
has aspects of congressional imposition on state authority that raise 
questions under one of the Court's most recent statements about 
federalism limits on congressional power.62 That statement, in New 
York v. United States, 63 is so unclear that a responsible legislator 
concerned about protecting the states from unjustified impositions 
59. Mark Graber has suggested, however, one form of policy distortion that deserves 
note. Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 
7 Sroo. IN AM. Pm .. DEV. 35 (1993). Graber argues that legislators sometimes deliberately 
choose to pass the buck to the courts, relying on the existence of judicial review to address a 
contentious political issue that the legislators themselves were unable to resolve, whether 
through ordinary politics or through the invocation of constitutional norms in the legislative 
process. 
60. If the legislature refrains from developing its own understanding of the Constitution 
out of a misplaced allocation of sole constitutional responsibility to the courts, the problem of 
democratic debilitation arises. 
61. I omit discussion here of those relatively rare situations where changes in the compo-
sition of the Court make it difficult to predict the outcome of such litigation even though the 
articulated norms are clear enough. These situations are made complex by the intrusion of 
yet another concern, the weight the new Court gives stare decisis. More commonly, previ-
ously clear norms become unclear over time, as the Court's composition changes or as com-
peting lines of precedent develop. 
62. For an extensive analysis, see Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National 
Health Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 
489 (1994). 
63. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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would be unable to get any guidance from the Court's norm. 64 
Such a legislator ought to ignore New York v. United States6s be-
cause it does not tell her anything usefu.l even about the Court's 
understanding of the Constitution.66 Therefore, where the courts' 
constitutional norms are indecipherable, the existence of judicial re-
view cannot distort policy. 
b. Clear Judicial Norms. Where the implications of the judi-
cially articulated norms are clear, and the legislature nonetheless 
ignores those norms, it is helpful to distinguish between cases in 
which it is reasonably clear that the courts would invalidate the leg-
islation and those in which it is reasonably clear that they would 
uphold it. 
Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III provoked a flurry of 
extreme rhetoric when he suggested that legislators, due to their 
oath to uphold the Constitution, could ignore judicially articulated 
norms even if those norms clearly implied that the courts would 
hold their proposals unconstitutional.67 Much in the responses to 
Meese's suggestion was overstated, but they had a core of good 
sense. Consider, for example, a criminal statute that the courts are 
sure to hold unconstitutional. Unless a potential defendant can 
somehow obtain pre-enforcement judicial review, she will have to 
undergo the cost and trauma of putting up a defense to a criminal 
prosecution whose outcome is, for all practical purposes, predeter-
64. See Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Consti· 
tutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
593 (1994) (emphasizing the lack of clarity in New York v. United States). 
65. Neither my research assistants nor I have found any references to New York v. United 
States in the available hearings or debates on health care reform. This is not to say that no 
one referred to the case, but it seems a sufficient basis for saying that the Court's decision has 
not played a large part in Congress's deliberations. The discussions do contain references to 
federalism, usually in the context of asserting that the joint federal-state arrangements are 
appropriate methods of administering a reformed health care plan in a federal system. With· 
out making too much of the fact, I also note that I briefed a member of the President's Task 
Force on Health care Reform on the constitutional questions likely to arise in connection 
with health care reform and emphasized that the federalism issues associated with New York 
v. United States were likely to be the most important and neglected constitutional questions 
the President's proposals would raise. 
66. That conclusion holds even if Congress enacts legislation that the Court holds uncon-
stitutional "under" New York v. United States. It would be that decision that could give an 
indication of what the judicially articulated norm really is; New York v. United States does 
not. 
67. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tur... L. REv. 979 (1987). 
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mined.68 Because the Court will ultimately vacate, it is unclear 
what good public purposes enacting the statute serves.69 
When a legislator ignores clear judicial norms in these circum-
stances, she acts rather imprudently. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the legislature acted solely because the courts articulated a 
norm with which it disagreed so vigorously, perhaps we could say 
that, in a perverse way, judicial review resulted in policy distortion. 
Of course, this distortion would not be the result of ignoring the 
Court's articulated constitutional norm but rather would be the re-
sult of peculiar legislative attention to that norm. 
The case where legislators ignore clear judicial norms that indi-
cate any resulting legislation would be upheld provides a better 
transition to a full discussion of the problem of policy distortion. 
Here the judicial norm implies that legislators may but need not 
change the status quo. In these situations, the distinction between 
judicially articulated and legislatively articulated constitutional 
norms can have real significance. This point is easiest to see in con-
nection with minimal-rationality review in equal protection cases. 
The Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause 
does not impose a strong norm of fair treatment of different groups 
unless the groups have characteristics that make them particularly 
vulnerable to legislative exploitation, or the interests affected are 
themselves of constitutional importance. Rather, legislatures need 
only satisfy the courts that the course they have adopted is a ra-
tional way of accomplishing some public end. 
Two of the Court's reasons for this doctrine are especially im-
portant in this context. First, the Court has expressed concern that 
imposing a stronger norm would have destabilizing implications be-
cause the norm would operate as a precedent in areas other than 
the one in which it was initially articulated.70 Second, the Court has 
suggested that it is institutionally incapable of assessing the infer-
68. Of course, for that very reason, the trauma would likely be less severe than that nor-
mally associated with appearing as a defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
69. I put aside the possibility that courts may take the statute's enactment as a signal that 
their previously articulated norms are so wrong that they ought to be reconsidered. See 
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
70. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) ("[l]f we accepted McCleskey's 
claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon 
be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 248 (1976) ("A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, 
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than an-
other would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, 
a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be 
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white."). 
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mation relevant to an informed decision about the fairness of differ-
ential treatment.71 Both of these reasons emphasize the special 
characteristics of courts that impose limits on the norms they articu-
late.72 Legislatures, lacking those characteristics, have the capacity 
to articulate different and more precise norms. 
Suppose Congress is considering a health care reform proposal 
to finance some but not all treatments for cancer. A member pro-
poses to amend the plan to guarantee financing for allogeneic bone 
marrow transplants for leukemia, saying that norms of equal treat-
ment make it unfair to include treatments that are effective for 
many patients but to exclude the only effective treatment for pa-
tients with a particular form of cancer.73 I believe that it would not 
make sense to respond to that argument by pointing out what is 
undoubtedly true - that the courts would never find a refusal to 
finance allogeneic bone marrow transplants to be in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The reason is that the refusal may satisfy 
the minimal standard of rationality review74 that the courts use be-
cause of their institutional incapacities but may nonetheless violate 
what we may now call a legislatively articulated norm of equal 
protection.75 
In situations where, for reasons of institutional limits, courts, re-
fuse to articulate meaningful constitutional norms, it appears that it 
is not only appropriate for the legislature to articulate constitu-
tional norms but also necessary because it is the only body capable 
of finding meaningful limits in the Constitution. An event typical 
when a controversial bill is before a legislature provides a useful 
71. 481 U.S. at 319 ("McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bod-
ies .... [which] are better qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies 
.... ' ''). 
72. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978). 
73. For a discussion of allogeneic bone marrow transplants as a treatment for leukemia, 
see Dexter v. Kirschner, 984 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no constitutional violation in 
state medicaid statute providing financing for autologous but not allogeneic bone marrow 
transplants, where only allogeneic transplants hold out possibility of successful treatment). 
74. I think it suggestive that these issues are ordinarily discussed under headings like 
"standards of review," which explicitly direct attention to what courts do in reviewing legisla-
tion, not to the Constitution itself. 
75. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993)), makes it appropriate to 
emphasize that not all responses to judicially articulated norms make equal sense. Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), relied in part on the courts' inability to use 
sensibly a "compelling state interest" test to determine whether facially neutral rules that 
adversely affected religious practices were constitutional. See 494 U.S. at 886-88. The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act directs the courts to use that test. Given the Supreme 
Court's claim that the judicial branch lacks the capacity to do so, one wonders what Congress 
believed it was accomplishing in enacting the legislation. 
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contrast to the cases discussed earlier. An opponent will point out 
that existing judicial decisions imply that the proposal is unconstitu-
tional. Supporters respond that, although they cannot be sure until 
the courts actually rule on the issue, they believe that the proposal 
is consistent with the judicially articulated norms. Occasionally, 
commentators treat this practice as an illustration of how legislators 
are indifferent to constitutional values.16 
I believe that is the wrong way to look at the legislators' posi-
tion. If, as they claim, the proposal's constitutionality is fairly litiga-
ble, that is, if the courts might find it consistent with judicially 
articulated norms, the legislators should be understood to assert 
one crucial proposition: that, when a proposal's constitutionality is 
fairly litigable,77 legislators may - and perhaps should - articu-
late their own understanding of constitutional norms.78 
Policy distortion would occur if legislators took the judicially ar-
ticulated norms as dispositive of the Constitution's meaning and 
chose to refrain from adopting a statute that, in their view, might 
advance constitutional norms as they understand them, simply be-
cause the courts might not define the Constitution's norms in the 
same way. In short, policy distortion would occur if legislators did 
not ignore what the courts might say. 
2. When Legislators Take Judicially Articulated Norms 
Into Account 
Judicial review means that legislators will necessarily act in the 
shadow of the courts' constitutional interpretation,79 and prudence 
indicates that they sometimes ought to anticipate what the courts 
will do with the policies they enact. Thayer's argument for a mini-
mal scope of judicial review was aimed at reducing the size of this 
76. See, e.g., Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of 
American Campaign Finance, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1354 (1994) (arguing that Congress 
has been "ignoring constitutional issues" in developing reform proposals). Sorauf quotes a 
source indicating that at least some Senators believed that these constitutional questions 
were fairly litigable. Id. 
77. Note that the fact that the position is fairly litigable eliminates the imprudence in-
volved when a legislature enacts a statute that is sure to be held unconstitutional. 
78. They may also be asserting a number of other propositions as predicates for the claim 
that their position is fairly litigable: first, the fact that the legislation was enacted might 
persuade the courts to interpret their prior norms in a way that would make the legislation 
consistent with those norms; second, the meaning of the judicially articulated norms can only 
be understood in the context of actual cases; and third, the prior cases involved different 
statutes that are distinguishable in ways made relevant by the judicially articulated norms 
themselves. 
79. As previously discussed, see supra text accompanying notes 37-53, this is not the case 
when a true political question is involved. There legislators act with no guidance from the 
courts and with no prospect of judicial review. 
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shadow. This section considers whether and when it makes sense to 
minimize judicial review because of the problem of policy 
distortion. 
Initially, I must emphasize again that it is not obvious that legis-
lating in the shadow of judicial review necessarily creates a problem 
of policy distortion. It may only create a situation in which a legis-
lature adopts a constitutionally permissible policy when its deeper 
preference is for a constitutionally impermissible one. For example, 
one interpretation of the French legislative response to the Consti-
tutional Council's nationalization decision might be that a legisla-
tive majority strongly desired to nationalize the affected 
enterprises. The legislative majority's first choice was to nationalize 
without paying the compensation the constitution required; its sec-
ond choice was to nationalize and pay the required compensation. 
Its first choice, that is, was to violate the constitution as understood 
by the Constitutional Council; its second choice was to comply with 
the constitution.80 To characterize the outcome as a policy distor-
tion resulting from judicial review requires some additional 
analysis. 
Policy distortion due to judicial review might occur in the fol-
lowing way: the French legislature's first preference is nationaliza-
tion without the compensation the Constitutional Council requires; 
its second preference is no nationalization;s1 and its third prefer-
ence is nationalization with compensation at the level the Council's 
decision requires. Despite this preference ordering and because of 
the Council's decision, the legislature enacts nationalization with 
the Council-required compensation. This begs the obvious ques-
tion: Why would a legislature follow its third preference rather 
than simply give up on the effort? 
Before exploring possible explanations for this result, other ex-
amples may be instructive. In 1988, the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that existing legislation regulating the availability of abortion 
violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 82 The prevailing 
opinions emphasized that the legislation impaired the Charter's 
guarantee of security of the person because the procedures it re-
quired before a woman could obtain a lawful abortion caused un-
80. For an alternative interpretation, see infra text accompanying notes 113-15. 
81. Or, as discussed below, a substantially restructured nationalization bill. See infra text 
accompanying notes 113-15. 
82. Morgentaler v. The Queen, 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1988). 
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necessary delay.83 Parliament might have responded to the decision 
by rewriting the statute to eliminate the procedures the court found 
problematic. Proposals to do so were introduced, but Parliament 
found itself unable to enact them. Instead, no legislation was 
adopted.84 It turned out that, when forced to choose between no 
regulation of abortion and regulations that might have complied 
with what the court seemed to demand, a majority of Parliament 
preferred no regulation.ss 
In the United States, parallel questions about the occurrence of 
policy distortion may be raised in connection with congressional 
flag-burning and campaign-finance legislation. After the Supreme 
Court held a Texas ban on flag burning an unconstitutional regula-
tion of speech based on its content,86 Congress attempted to devise 
a constitutionally permissible altemative.87 The resulting legisla-
tion, the Flag Protection Act of 1989,88 made it a crime to mutilate, 
physically defile, or burn a flag. Its sponsors asserted, with some 
support from legal academics and Supreme Court precedent, that 
because their proposal was aimed at protecting the physical integ-
rity of the flag, it was content-neutral and therefore constitutional.89 
83. 44 D.L.R.4th at 402-07, 414 (Dickson, C.J.C., plurality opinion) ("I conclude that the 
procedures ..• for obtaining a therapeutic abortion do not comport with the principles of 
fundamental justice"); see also 44 D.L.R.4th at 429-40 (Beetz, J., concurring). 
84. For an analysis, see F.L. MORTON, PRO-CHOICE vs. PRO-LIFE: ABORTION AND THE 
COURTS IN CANADA 290-92 (1992). 
85. More precisely, no majority could be formed in support of any particular set of regu-
lations that might have complied with the Canadian Supreme Court's requirements. It may 
be, of course, that the majority's preferences changed between the time the legislature en-
acted the invalidated statute and the time Parliament considered a new statute. That is, at 
the time the statute was enacted, a majority may have preferred the enacted statute to a 
procedurally regular statute (as the Court eventually required) and a procedurally regular 
statute to none at all; but, by the time Parliament considered the issue the second time, a 
majority preferred no statute to a procedurally regular one and to the invalidated statute. 
For a discussion of how constitutional courts may assist in purging the statute books of laws 
that have lost majority support, see BICKEL, supra note 2, at 148-56, and Guwo CALABRESI, 
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-30 (1982). 
86. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
87. For an overview of the congressional process, see Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning 
Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 357 (1992). 
88. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (held unconstitutional 
by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)). 
89. See, e.g., Hearings on the United States Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson 
Before the United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 187, 200 (1989) 
(Statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor of Law and Dean, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School}, reprinted in 2 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG-
BuRNING CASES 361, 374 (Michael Kent Curtis ed., 1993) ("I cannot say - and I do not 
think anyone can fairly say - that the [proposed] Flag Protection Act is necessarily constitu-
tional or necessarily unconstitutional under existing law. There are at least reasonable 
grounds to believe, however, that the proposed legislation might be upheld by the Supreme 
Court."). 
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The Supreme Court disagreed in United States v. Eichman,90 
finding that the government's interest in protecting the flag from 
destruction was content-based. According to Justice Brennan, "the 
mere destruction . . . of a particular physical manifestation of the 
symbol, without more, does not diminish or otherwise affect the 
symbol itself .... "91 The government's "desire to preserve the flag 
as a symbol for certain national ideals is implicated 'only when a 
person's treatment of the flag communicates [a] message' to others 
that is inconsistent with those ideals."92 
The flag-burning controversy may illustrate policy distortion due 
to judicial review. Perhaps members of Congress wanted only a 
flag-burning ban that would violate judicially articulated free-
speech norms and would have preferred no ban at all to one that 
hypocritically purported to satisfy the Court's demand for content 
neutrality. After all, Congress did not respond to Eichman with yet 
another attempt to develop a flag-burning ban that the Court could 
find constitutional. An effort to amend the Constitution failed, and 
the flag-burning episode ended. When pressed to choose between a 
statute that might satisfy the Supreme Court and no statute at all, 
Congress made the latter choice. On this view, the Flag Protection 
Act of 1989 was a policy distortion. 
Legislative proposals to reform the campaign-finance system 
may reflect similar distortions. In developing such proposals, mem-
bers of Congress operate within the constraints placed on them by 
Buckley v. Valeo. 93 It may well be that they would strongly prefer 
to develop proposals without facing those constraints.94 In this 
sense, Congress structures the reform proposals in the shadow of 
judicial review.9s 
Policy distortion would occur if campaign-finance reforms 
designed in Buckley's shadow were likely to be worse public policy 
than the existing campaign-finance system. The argument here 
would be tied to the problem that campaign-finance legislation, for 
90. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
91. 496 U.S. at 316. 
92. 496 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted). 
93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
94. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 375, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1993) ("However, short of 
challenging the Buckley decision or amending the Constitution, our only real alternative is to 
propose a system of spending limits for candidates, in exchange for certain benefits."). 
95. This is so despite the observation, which I have no reason to question, that the princi-
pal reform proposal may raise nine constitutional problems. See Sorauf, supra note 76, at 
1353. Those questions are fairly litigable. For a discussion of the issues under these circum-
stances, see supra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
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predictable reasons, tends to be incumbent-protective.96 According 
to this argument, we can come as close as possible to avoiding in-
cumbent protection only if we level the playing field by placing 
equal limits on what incumbents, challengers, and their respective 
supporters can spend.97 Buckley, however, makes that impossible. 
As things are now, the argument continues, challengers have some 
chance at winning, but under some new regime adopted within the 
constraints Buckley set, incumbents will actually strengthen their 
position, making it harder for their challengers to win. The conclu-
sion is that the status quo is better public policy than any legislation 
likely to be adopted within Buckley's constraints, though worse 
public policy than the one Buckley bars. If policy distortion occurs 
when legislators adopt a policy that is worse than the status quo and 
worse than a constitutionally permissible alternative defined in a 
positivist sense as one the courts would find constitutionally permis-
sible,9s we need to understand why they do so.99 Two plausible ex-
planations for the distorting effect of judicial review are legislative 
misunderstanding of judicially articulated constitutional norms and 
bargaining breakdowns resulting from the invalidation of a legisla-
ture's preferred policy choice. 
96. It is enacted by incumbents, after all. I note, however, that to the extent that the 
statute invalidated in Buckley is treated here as good public policy because it would have 
weakened the position of incumbents, I would need to provide an explanation for its adop-
tion. In doing so, I would develop a distinction akin to but weaker than Bruce Ackerman's 
distinction between ordinary politics, which is at work after Buckley, and constitutional poli-
tics, whose relative would have been at work to produce the statute invalidated in Buckley. 
97. The playing field cannot be made completely level, of course, because both incum-
bents and challengers have nonfinancial resources - the availability of free publicity through 
sponsoring legislation, their precampaign celebrity, and the like - that are not distributed 
equally. 
98. And, for reasons discussed supra in note 96, worse than the statute the courts have 
invalidated. 
99. I note one possibility, which has played a larger role in the scholarly literature than 
seems justified. Alexander Bickel's presentation of the Thayer argument relied in part on 
Charles Black's suggestion that the Court may play a particularly important role in legitimat-
ing legislative policy. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 29-31. When the courts refrain from 
holding a statute unconstitutional, legislators may misunderstand them as saying, not that the 
legislation is not inconsistent with judicially articulated constitutional norms, but that it is 
sound public policy. If this occurs, legislators may refrain from adopting legislation that 
would be better public policy and that the courts would in fact uphold. This may occur, but 
there are notable examples of judicial decisions upholding legislation that did not have this 
effect. The Supreme Court's school finance decision, San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), probably had little impact on continuing efforts to re-
form school-financing systems. After the Supreme Court found that Oregon had not violated 
the Constitution in refusing to exempt the sacramental use of peyote from its general prohi-
bition on drug use, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Oregon legislature 
enacted such an exemption. See OR. REv. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1993). I suspect that these 
responses are common enough to give the "legitimation" account of why legislatures enact 
worse public policy than they could a much smaller domain than the scholarly literature 
suggests. 
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The first reason is misunderstanding the judicially articulated 
norms. The courts' rulings will define a range of actions that are 
constitutionally permissible or whose permissibility is fairly litiga-
ble. Within that range, legislators can articulate their own under-
standing of constitutional norms. If legislators mistakenly believe 
that the permissible range is smaller than it actually is, they may 
choose a policy that is less desirable, from their own point of view, 
than one that the courts would allow them to adopt. Put differ-
ently, policy distortion occurs when the legislature acts within the 
range of policies it believes is available to it, mistakenly believing 
that the policy they prefer is outside that available range. 
Misunderstanding might be common, in part because not all leg-
islators are well-advised about the norms the courts have articu-
lated.100 In addition, outside groups have an interest in 
characterizing judicially articulated norms in the way most 
favorable to their positions. On nearly every issue, some group will 
have an interest in arguing that a particular policy proposal lies 
outside the permissible range. Legislators concerned about not en-
acting unconstitutional laws or worried about the cost of defending 
a fairly litigable policy that the courts might reject may give these 
arguments more weight than they deserve. 
The obvious remedy for misunderstanding is education.101 In 
this connection, some aspects of judicial confirmation hearings de-
serve note. Recent hearings have involved extended exchanges be-
tween Senators and the nominees about constitutional 
interpretation. To the extent that these exchanges were designed to 
elicit commitments from the nominees on particular issues, they 
were probably misguided and futile.102 Perhaps they should be 
100. For example, a proponent of a federal statute to grant only limited authority to local 
governments to designate facilities to which solid waste could be sent argued that "Congress 
should follow the Supreme Court's ruling that flow control was a burden to [sic] interstate 
commerce." House Approves Flow Control Legislation to Restore Full Authority to Munici-
palities, 25 Envt. Rep. (BNA) (Envt. Rep. Cas.) 1147 (Oct. 7, 1994) (citation omitted). In 
light of the way the Supreme Court has constructed its doctrine, however, judicial decisions 
invalidating local regulations of commerce as burdensome do not provide arguments in favor 
of or against any congressional action. Further, the decision to which the speaker referred 
may be understood as striking down a local flow-control ordinance as discriminatory rather 
than burdensome. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994). 
101. In 1994, Representatives David Skaggs and Jim Leach convened a series of "Consti-
tutional Forums" for interested members of the House of Representatives, at which experts 
outlined their understanding of the constitutional law relevant to issues the members might 
have to address. For a brief description, see David G. Savage, Congress's Constitutional Fo-
rum, CONST., Fall 1994, at 96. I participated in one forum, on the constitutional law of reli-
gion. About 20 members attended. Their comments suggested that there was a fair degree 
of misunderstanding, at least in the sense that some members believed that policies that I 
would characterize as fairly litigable or even clearly permissible were actually impermissible. 
102. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MEss 80-82 (1994). 
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seen, though, as efforts to educate j:he public, including other legis-
lators, about the limits the courts have set on permissible legisla-
tion.103 For an academic, the discussions about what a "compelling 
state interest" is and when "strict scrutiny" is triggered, might seem 
painfully oversimplified.104 But, for legislators, the discussions 
might lead to a better understanding of the range within which they 
can permissibly act - not because the legislators would be in a 
position to pass a law school examination in constitutional law with 
flying colors after hearing the discussions but because they would 
be less likely to make a mistake about what the courts will let them 
do.10s 
Devising an institution that could provide adequate continuing 
education for legislators, however, might prove quite difficult.106 
To reduce the occasions when policy distortion results from misun-
derstanding, such an institution must produce disinterested consti-
tutional evaluations of policy proposals.1°7 To best serve its 
educational purpose, its judgments should be in the form, "if this 
proposal is enacted, there is an 80% chance that the Supreme Court 
ultimately will hold it unconstitutional, but if that one is enacted, 
there is only a 50% chance that the Court would do so." I believe 
that it would be quite difficult to structure the incentives of the in-
stitution's staff to ensure that they would give answers in that form 
rather than in the form, "the first proposal is unconstitutional, and 
the second is probably not unconstitutional. "108 
103. I draw here on the impressions I had after briefing a member of the Senate in con-
nection with a recent nomination. For additional observations about methods of educating 
the public about constitutional norms, see infra text accompanying notes 106-08. 
104. For an example of the difficulty, see ETIIAN BRONNER, BATILE FOR JusncE: How 
nm BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 254-55 (1989) (describing the discussion of stan-
dard of review in gender discrimination cases during Bork's confirmation hearings). 
105. Note as well, that minimal judicial review can serve as a form of education by in-
structing legislators that the courts' view of the Constitution does not preclude them from 
adopting the policy they prefer. 
106. William Landes and Richard Posner have argued that advisory opinions may be a 
useful way of avoiding what they call "erroneous constitutional interpretations" in systems 
where amending the Constitution is relatively easy. See William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL Sron. 683, 710-11 (1994). 
The erroneous interpretations to which they refer are errors by the high court that can be 
corrected by constitutional amendment. Their model assumes that the legislature will not 
enact a statute without a favorable advisory opinion. An unfavorable advisory opinion 
would lead the legislature to amend the Constitution. On that assumption, the advisory opin-
ion is more a coercive than an educational mechanism of the sort I am considering. 
107. One might imagine here institutions like the Congressional Budget Office or the 
Office of Technology Assessment, both designed to give Congress disinterested advice. 
108. I am also skeptical that such an institution would attract staff members of a high 
enough quality to make their advice useful as a form of education. 
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Bargaining breakdowns that occur as a result of judicial review 
might be another reason why legislators would adopt a less desira-
ble policy. Economic theory provides a useful metaphor here. 
Thomas Schelling pointed out that people who need to coordinate 
their actions but are unable to communicate with each other can 
accomplish their goal of coordination by identifying an "obvious" 
focal point on which to converge.109 Schelling's most dramatic ex-
ample is outdated: How can two people who need to meet in New 
York City get together without communicating with each other? 
Relying on a survey he conducted, Schelling concluded that each 
person would do best by arriving at Grand Central Station's infor-
mation booth at noon.110 
Suppose, though, that both people know that it is impossible to 
meet there, perhaps because construction has closed the area. They 
might not succeed in meeting if each tried to get as close as possible 
to Grand Central Station's information booth at noon: one might 
be at the comer of Madison Avenue and 42nd St. while the other 
waited at the comer of Sixth Avenue and 42nd St. If they gave up 
on Grand Central Station as a focal point, however, their second 
choice of meeting place might again be the same. 
The difficulty in this example arises because of an ambiguity in 
the direction "try to get as close to Grand Central Station's infor-
mation booth as possible." If both people interpret it to mean, 
"given our mutual desire to meet, locate the place, other than the 
information booth, that my partner is most likely to think a sensible 
place to meet," they might choose the same place once more.111 
But, if one or both interpret the direction to mean, "get as physi-
cally close to the information booth as possible," they may end up 
missing each other. 
Why, then, might someone interpret the directive in this geo-
graphical way? Perhaps because she has become "anchored" to the 
geographical definition in the first effort to locate a meeting 
place.112 Although one might revert to the policies underlying the 
attempt to meet, having once chosen a meeting place, that location 
109. THOMAS C. SCHELUNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (1960). 
110. As Schelling acknowledged, the "obviousness" of this solution may have arisen be-
cause he conducted his survey in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 55 n.1. 
111. The second choice might be similar in some sense to the first choice, for example, if 
they chose the information booth at Penn Station, or they might be quite different, for exam-
ple, if they chose the Cloisters; the latter choice might arise if each thought, "the first choice 
is impossible; what's the farthest thing from that I can think of?" 
112. On the anchoring phenomenon, see RICHARD N1sBETI & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFER· 
ENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 41-42 (1980) ("[O]nce sub-
jects have made a first pass at a problem, the initial judgment may prove remarkably resistant 
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anchors the search for an alternative by providing the starting point 
for the search. 
A judicial decision invalidating a statute can be analogized to 
the unavailable Grand Central Station information booth. Legisla-
tors would prefer to have the invalidated legislation. If they cannot 
have that, they may take the decision as the anchor for what they 
do next. They may try to get as close as possible to what they en-
acted in the first place, within the limits the court sets, defining "as 
close as possible" to mean "departing as little from what we already 
did" rather than "accomplishing as many of our prior policy goals 
as we can." So, for example, the French legislature responded to 
the Constitutional Council's nationalization decision by enacting a 
new compensation formula rather than choosing to redefine the na-
ture or scope of the nationalization program. That choice, however, 
may have resulted in worse policy, again from the French legisla-
ture's own point of view, than if they had abandoned the nationali-
zation program entirely113 or if they had restructured it 
substantially.114 
The judicial decision might become an anchor for a number of 
reasons. First, like the Grand Central Station information booth, it 
provides an obvious place to begin a reconsideration of the invali-
dated policy. If it was at all complex, the invalidated statute em-
bodied a number of compromises. Restructuring the program 
might require reopening all the compromises. Working from the 
judicial decision, in contrast, legislators may be able to reopen only 
relatively few. Second, legislators, in order to conserve legislative 
energy, may stop as soon as they develop a policy just within the 
limits the court decision establishes. Third, the judicial decision 
may provoke annoyance: legislators may want to demonstrate their 
disagreement with the courts by reenacting a statute that is as simi-
lar as possible to the one the court invalidated.11s 
to further information, alternative modes of reasoning, and even logical or evidential 
challenges."). 
113. For example, the new compensation formula so substantially increased the amount 
needed to pay for nationalization that it may well have impaired the government's economic 
recovery program. 
114. For example, it might have made better policy sense to adopt the compensation 
formula the Council required and then work out which industries to nationalize, given the 
constraint that nationalization's cost should not exceed what the original plan would have 
cost under the unconstitutional compensation formula. 
115. This may explain why the bargaining breakdown takes the judicial decision as the 
anchor rather than the obvious alternative, the status quo that would exist if the legislature 
did nothing in response to that decision. 
274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:245 
However these bargaining breakdowns occur, they produce leg-
islation that is less desirable than it could be, even within the limits 
the courts have established. Notably, the breakdowns have this ef-
fect because of judicial review. In this sense, as Thayer argued, pol-
icy distortion does result from judicial review. · 
Minimal judicial review, though, is only one response to this dif-
ficulty. There is an alternative response: judicially articulated 
norms so clear that legislators will never even propose their most 
preferred policy because they know it is unconstitutional. Without 
an initial invalid proposal, legislators have nothing to become 
anchored to and thus will immediately move to their second 
preference.116 
Clarity might be a theoretically attractive solution to the prob-
lem of policy distortion caused by bargaining breakdown,117 but it 
may not be achievable in practice. Legal realists and their succes-
sors claim that legal rules cannot achieve a great deal of clarity: 
they are riddled with exceptions; the system of rules taken as a 
whole contains counter-rules that can be deployed to introduce 
confusion; and skilled lawyers can bring into high relief background 
rules that had previously been taken for granted. Whatever might 
be said about the validity of the most comprehensive versions of 
such claims, the realist claim is likely to have a fair amount of force 
in the constitutionally freighted areas to which legislators direct 
their attention.118 Moreover, the Supreme Court has the opportu-
nity to articulate clear rules only when presented with actual legisla-
tion, and no matter how clear the rules then are, the invalidated law 
remains available as an anchor for policy distortion. 
Finally, clarity in constitutional rules, which might reduce the 
problem of policy distortion, could increase the problem of demo-
cratic debilitation. Unclear constitutional rules provide opportuni-
116. This is why a practice of obtaining advisory opinions might not be an adequate re-
sponse to the problem of policy distortion. A properly framed request for such an opinion is 
likely to be based on a legislative proposal that has reached a relatively advanced stage, with 
sufficient political support to be close to enactment if a favorable advisory opinion is ob-
tained. If the advisory opinion is against the proposal's constitutionality, still it will have 
been in a sufficiently concrete form to serve as an anchor for future proposals. 
117. It might provide additional support for a jurisprudence of rules rather than stan-
dards. Kathleen Sullivan has argued that it is unclear that the two types of jurisprudence 
actually produce other results claimed for them. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 
(1992). One might wonder whether a jurisprudence of rules would have the effect described 
here. 
118. For a suggestion along these lines, see Brian Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL 
THEORY (forthcoming 1995). 
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ties for the public to discuss the Constitution's meaning.119 Where 
the Court insists that the meaning it has given the Constitution is 
crystal-clear, the public may find itself entirely removed from the 
domain of constitutional discourse. 
Education and clear rules resulting from the exercise of more-
than-minimal judicial review might reduce the scope of the problem 
of policy distortion. Of course, so too would minimal judicial 
review.120 
II. THE NOTWITHSTANDING CLAUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DEMOCRATIC DEBILITATION 
Minimal judicial review has also been suggested as a method of 
dealing with the problem of democratic debilitation. That problem 
occurs when the public and their democratically elected representa-
tives cease to formulate and discuss constitutional norms, instead 
relying on the courts to address constitutional problems. A consti-
tutional democrat might be concerned about democratic debilita-
tion for two reasons. First, in transferring responsibility for 
articulating constitutional norms from the public and their repre-
sentatives to the courts, more-than-minimal judicial review may di-
minish the public's attachment to the Constitution and, more 
important, to the norms they might themselves find in the Constitu-
tion. Second, to the extent that the courts' articulation of constitu-
tional norms ought to have some connection to the public's views, 
democratic debilitation may deprive the courts of information they 
should find useful.121 The Canadian experience with judicial review 
provides interesting insights into the problems of democratic 
debilitation and the potential difficulties of dealing with the prob-
119. As discussed earlier, unclear rules need not have that effect. They may instead lead 
the public to disregard what the Court says, on the ground that they cannot understand it. 
See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
120. Such review might introduce its own "distortion" if legislators come to believe that 
policies the courts will hold to be constitutionally permissible are affirmatively desirable for 
that reason alone. For this form of distortion to occur, a legislator who thinks a statute is 
misguided as a matter of policy would be persuaded to vote for it because she was convinced 
that the courts would uphold it. The scenario is possible, but I wonder how frequently it 
occurs. 
121. One might note here the death-penalty and flag-burning controversies. To the ex-
tent that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence makes central "evolving standards of 
decency," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), the public reaction to the Court's invalida-
tion of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was relevant to its 
revalidation of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The example 
would be more persuasive if one were confident that the reenactment of death penalty Jaws 
resulted from a considered public judgment about what its present standards of decency 
were, rather than from mere disagreement with the policy resulting from Furman. For a 
discussion of the flag-burning controversy, see infra text accompanying notes 185-88. 
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lem effectively without sacrificing more-than-minimal judicial 
review. 
Section 33 of the Canadian Charter authorizes Canadian legisla-
tures, at the provincial and national levels, to override specific guar-
antees of individual rights. Section 33 states that "Parliament or the 
legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parlia-
ment or of the legislature . . . that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in" the Charter's 
provisions dealing with fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and 
equality rights. These declarations can be in effect for no longer 
than five years, the maximum period a government remains in 
power without going to the people in an election campaign, but 
they can be renewed indefinitely.122 
Mary Ann Glendon has argued that section 33 is one of the ele-
ments of the Charter showing "how, even in a country within the 
Anglo-American legal orbit, rights can appear in strong, but not 
absolute, form."123 Michael Perry has suggested that section 33 
might provide one solution to the problem of democratic debilita-
tion by offering "an opportunity for a deliberative judicial consider-
ation of a difficult and perhaps divisive constitutional issue and an 
opportunity for electorally accountable officials to respond, in the 
course of ordinary politics, in an effective way."124 As is usually 
true in comparative exercises, the story is more complicated than 
such summary descriptions suggest. 
Section A provides an overview of the political situation in Can-
ada that gave rise to section 33 and offers insights into a possible 
limited interpretation that it might have been given. This section 
goes on to explore the implications that limited interpretation 
would have on constitutional review and the problem of democratic 
debilitation. Section B then examines the power of the U.S. Con-
gress to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts and puts forth 
possible reasons why it has not served a function similar to section 
33. Section C looks at how the Canadian Supreme Court eventually 
applied and interpreted section 33 in a way inconsistent with the 
122. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms),§ 33. 
123. GLENDON, supra note 11, at 39. 
124. Perry, supra note 5, at 158; see also Taber v. Maine, 45 F.3d 598, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Calabresi, J.) (drawing an analogy between § 33 and strained statutory interpretation, 
designed to alert Congress to "constitutional dangers" which can be overridden by clear 
statement); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN nm COURTS: LAW OR Pouncs?, 
196-201 (1994) (discussing the desirability of adopting the "Canadian innovation" in the 
United States); Perry, supra note 5, at 159 ("Adopting the Canadian innovation would signif-
icantly enhance, not diminish, the constitutional and moral responsibility of the people."). 
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limited interpretation offered in section A and examines some of 
the causes and effects of this broad interpretation. Section D deals 
with the ability of section 33 to change outcomes of legislatively 
determined policy decisions and examines the possibility that the 
educative value of judicial review might serve as an impetus for pol-
icy changes. Section E concludes that the political forces that pro-
duced section 33 may have foreordained its failure and goes on to 
argue that the Canadian experience may call into question the prac-
ticability of the "notwithstanding clause" approach to the problem 
of democratic debilitation generally. 
A. Section 33's Background and How It Might Have 
Been Interpreted 
Canada's Prime Minister - and former law professor - Pierre 
Trudeau proposed to patriate the Canadian Constitution, that is, to 
establish a legal regime in which all constitutional questions could 
be resolved within Canada itself instead of requiring agreement 
from Great Britain. Trudeau believed that a properly functioning 
constitutional system required a written constitution subject to the 
control of the people themselves. He also hoped that patriation 
would provide the occasion for adopting a bill of rights and for 
resolving Canada's persistent language issue in favor of a nationally 
guaranteed bilingualism. Although the concept of patriation was 
not politically controversial, Trudeau's project met substantial op-
position, in large part because of concern about the nature of the 
constitution that Trudeau proposed to patriate. Leaders of Can-
ada's provinces believed that Trudeau wanted to patriate the consti-
tution in order to increase the power of the national government. 
Further, these leaders were suspicious of a system of entrenched 
rights that was inconsistent with the Canadian tradition of parlia-
mentary supremacy.125 Finally, the precise scope of the rights to be 
entrenched was itself controversia1.126 
Initially, the opposition focused on the means by which the peo-
ple of Canada could request patriation. Opponents argued that the 
national government could not request patriation alone but had to 
get the provinces to request it as well. Extensive political negotia-
125. See Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version, 18 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 64-65 (1984). This is so, even though the tradition of parliamentary 
supremacy incorporated respect for certain fundamental rights. A system in which such 
rights are habitually respected, however, is different from one in which they are legally 
guaranteed. 
126. See DALE GmsoN, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER: GENERAL PruNCIPLES 30-39 (1986). 
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tions proved fruitless, and the participants looked to the Canadian 
Supreme Court for a solution. That court refused to provide one. 
Its decision appeared to split the difference. The court held that as 
a matter of law the national government could request patriation 
even without the consent of the provinces, but it also held that do-
ing so without a substantial - though not unanimous - measure 
of provincial consent would violate an apparently nonlegal constitu-
tional convention.121 
This decision, or nondecision, led to another round of political 
bargaining. At the final session in November 1981, eight provinces 
continued to oppose patriation. The Canadian Supreme Court's 
decision meant that the national government could legally request 
patriation on its own, but it also meant that the national govern-
ment politically required the agreement of a substantial number of 
the provinces. The eight provincial leaders insisted that the new 
Canadian constitution could not be amended unless all provinces 
agreed, and they objected to the inclusion of a bill of rights; Tru-
deau believed that a unanimity requirement was a recipe for disas-
ter and that a constitution without a bill of rights was hardly worth 
adopting. 
Further negotiations resulted in a formula for amending the 
constitution that required unanimity for some important amend-
ments but allowed less than unanimous provincial consent for 
others.128 Saskatchewan's premier, a social democrat influenced by 
the traditional hostility toward entrenched bills of rights in the Eu-
ropean and especially British left,129 proposed a provision allowing 
legislative overrides of constitutional guarantees. Prime Minister 
Trudeau signed on after proposing a five-year time limit for over-
rides. The result of this proposal, section 33, was "[t]he dynamite 
that finally broke the political log jam."130 
Section 33 allayed enough concern so that the Charter was 
adopted in 1982, although Quebec refused to accede to it, at least in 
127. In re Amendment of the Constitution of Can., 125 D.L.R.3d 1, 89-103 (Can. 1981). 
128. See Katherine Swinton, Amending the Canadian Constitution: Lessons from Meech 
Lake, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 139, 140-44 (1992) (describing the six amending fonnulas). 
129. See MICHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? 47-52 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing leftist 
opposition to proposals for a British bill of rights). 
130. GIBSON, supra note 126, at 124; see also MANDEL, supra note 12, at 75 (Section 33 
"was conceded by the federal government to the opposing provinces as the price for agree-
ment to the constitutional package."); CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND 
THE CHARTER: CANADA AND THE PARADOX OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 199-200 
(1993); Weiler, supra note 125, at 80 n.97 (explaining that the court decision "put considera-
ble pressure on both sides to return to the bargaining table for one final attempt at 
settlement"). 
November 1995] Comparative Countermajoritarian Difficulty 279 
part because section 33 did not apply to language rights.131 By al-
lowing legislatures to override the Charter's entrenched provisions, 
the clause reconciled the existence of entrenched rights with the 
tradition of parliamentary supremacy. In addition, to the extent 
that courts were expected to enforce the rights conferred in the 
Charter, section 33 meant that "the last word would belong to the 
legislatures rather than the courts."132 The national Minister of Jus-
tice, for example, defended the clause on the relatively narrow 
ground that it would allow legislatures to deal with "absurd" court 
rulings.133 At the same time, however, the political setting in which 
section 33 developed meant that its -theoretical underpinnings were 
not well-developed.134 
As a textual matter, section 33 lent itself to a narrow reading.135 
1\vo limitations immediately suggest themselves. First, in a system 
in which judicial review is routine, one might naturally read the 
clause to require that legislative overrides be retrospective. That is, 
the clause could be read to allow an override only with respect to a 
legislative provision that the courts had already held to be inconsis-
tent with the Charter's rights-protecting provisions.136 Otherwise, 
the textual argument goes, the legislative provision does not oper-
ate "notwithstanding" the Charter's other provisions; where there is 
no prior declaration of unconstitutionality, the legislative provision 
operates, so far as the legislature knows, in a manner entirely con-
sistent with the Charter. 
131. Because of the Supreme Court's holding that substantial consent was only a conven-
tion and not a legal requirement, the Charter could become legally effective without Que-
bec's consent 
132. Roger Tasse, Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in THE 
CANADIAN CHARTER OF R!Glfl'S AND FREEDOMS 65, 103 (Gerald A. Beaudoin & Ed 
Ratushny eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
133. GmsoN, supra note 126, at 125; see also Tasse, supra note 132, at 102-03. 
134. Manfredi notes that § 33 was not analyzed by the same process, a joint committee on 
the constitution, that examined the Charter's other provisions. See MANFRE01, supra note 
1'30, at 200. 
135. See Lorraine Weinrib, Learning to Live with the Override, 35 McGILL L.J. 541, 569 
(1990) ("The exceptional quality of the override suggests a narrow reading."). 
136. See Perry, supra note 5, at 158 (citing Brian Slattery, A Theory of the Charter, 25 
OsGOODE HALL L.J. 701, 742 (1987), and Donna Greschner & Ken Norman, The Courts and 
Section 33, 12 QUEEN'S L.J. 155, 188-97 (1987)); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Constitu-
tional Protection of Rights in Australia, in AUSTRAUAN FEDERATION: TOWARDS THE SEC-
OND CENTURY 151, 174-75 (Gregory Craven ed., 1992) (Section 33 "is thus posed as a power 
to override the Charter itself, rather than judicial interpretations of the Charter, and this 
must make its exercise more difficult to justify .... There is surely no need for an override 
clause to convey this impression, which is, at least from the legislature's point of view, erro-
neous.") In Ford v. Quebec, (1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 745-47 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Can-
ada discussed under the heading of "retrospectivity," whether an override provision could 
apply to legislation adopted in the nine-week period between the Charter's effective date and 
the date of the override's enactment; that is not what I am concerned with here. 
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Second, the clause rather naturally reads as if legislative over-
rides must be discrete. That is, in a single statute, a legislature can 
override only with respect to provisions of that very statute. The 
clause, after all, says that the legislature may declare "in an Act ... 
that the Act ... shall operate notwithstanding. "137 
Further, these narrow readings seem to be consistent with the 
proposition that section 33 was designed to accommodate en-
trenched rights and parliamentary supremacy. The narrow con-
struction would mean that "the legislative decision to enact an 
override clause is taken with full knowledge of the facts, thereby 
encouraging public discussion of the issues raised by the use of such 
a clause."138 The public would know, that is, that its legislature was 
about to deprive it or some part of it of entrenched rights, and as a 
result, political opposition to overriding those rights or political 
support for the group to be disadvantaged might be mobilized. As 
Paul Weiler put it, "[i]n a society sufficiently enamored of funda-
mental rights to enshrine them in its constitution, invocation of the 
non obstante [notwithstanding] phrase is guaranteed to produce a 
lot of political flak."139 
The image of .an informed electorate serving as a check on the 
legislative decision to override is consistent, as well, with the five-
year limit on the override's effect. No matter what the circum-
stances under which an override was enacted, a renewal would oc-
cur only after the government faced an election in which the 
override could be an issue. 
Finally, it might be suggested that a constitution with an over-
ride provision actually protects fundamental rights more effectively 
137. See Weiler, supra note 125, at 90 n.114 ("Both the wording and the spirit of§ 33 ..• 
seem to require a specific judgment by the legislature about each law it wishes to override."). 
It would seem unsound to interpret § 33 to require another form of targeting, the identifica-
tion in the override itself of the precise Charter provisions the legislation was to override. 
But cf. GRUNDGESElZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 19 (1) (F.R.G.) ("In so far as a basic right 
may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law •.. must name the 
basic right, indicating the Article concerned."). That would generate further litigation, as 
challengers contended that the enactment was inconsistent with some Charter provision not 
specified in the statute invoking § 33. For reasons that are not apparent to an outsider, the 
litigation discussed later in this article focused on this probably untenable version of the 
specificity requirement; the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the argument in the text in 
three sentences. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 743. Its analysis referred back to its conclusion, 
early in the decision, that § 33 imposed only requirements of form and that interpreting its 
formal requirements in light of "the continuing importance of legislative supremacy" or "the 
seriousness of a legislative decision to override guaranteed rights and freedoms" was not 
"particularly relevant or helpful" because such a construction "import[ed] into it grounds for 
substantive review of the legislative policy in exercising the override authority in a particular 
case." Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 740. 
138. Tasse, supra note 132, at 105-06. 
139. Weiler, supra note 125, at 81-82. 
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than one without it. John Whyte, who offered relatively mild criti-
cisms of section 33, argued that constitutional rights are placed at 
risk in two situations: "[W]hen legislatures neglect to calculate the 
extraordinary impact of legislative measures on particular individu-
als" and when, out of "fear and distaste," the majority makes a 
"facile and overstated" assessment of the risks of inaction.140 
Courts can intervene in the first situation, when the legislature acts 
unthinkingly; they are unlikely to do much in the second situation 
because they are likely to share the majority's presuppositions. 
When section 33 is invoked, the legislature overrides constitutional 
rights deliberately, not unthinkingly; the presence of such a provi-
sion in a constitution cannot affect the first situation. In the second 
situation, there is little hope for constitutional protections anyway. 
Occasionally, though, as Whyte points out, judges can stand apart 
from their society because of their traditions, professional orienta-
tion, and independence, and so there is some marginal gain in hav-
ing judicial review.141 
A similar marginal gain may be available from a notwithstand-
ing clause. Such a clause might make more visible the conse-
quences of what the legislature proposes to do and thereby might 
make it more difficult for the legislature to do it. That very visibil-
ity and deliberation that accompany the decision to invoke section 
33, however, may also ensure that the legislature actually does care-
fully assess the relevant competing interests more effectively than it 
had done when it enacted the statute in the first place. Of course, a 
notwithstanding clause can also make things worse in those cases 
where the courts would invalidate the legislation but are precluded 
from doing so by an override provision, for example, where the leg-
islature's reconsideration of the competing interests remains 
unbalanced. 
The narrow interpretation of section 33 links the entrenched 
rights directly to the political process. Consider the implications of 
interpreting section 33 to require targeted and retrospective over-
rides, in the senses described earlier. A proposal to invoke section 
33 would be tied to a single enactment, thus drawing public atten-
tion to the fact that the legislature proposed to enact a statute 
notwithstanding the individual rights provisions of the Charter. 
Further, the proposal would be a reaction to an authoritative deci-
140. John Whyte, On Not Standing for Notwithstanding, 28 ALBERTA L. REv. 347, 355 
(1990). 
141. Id. at 355-57. 
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sion specifying that its predecessor enactment did indeed violate 
one of those provisions. 
Court invalidation of a proposal on the grounds that it violates 
entrenched rights creates important political considerations. Anal-
ysis of whether a statute violates Charter rights proceeds in two 
steps.142 First, the court must decide whether the statute constitutes 
a limitation on a protected right. If it does, the court must then 
decide whether the limitation is "demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society."143 That is, judicial invalidation implies 
that the court has concluded that the limitation is not demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
What does a proposal to override such an invalidation imply? It 
may be helpful to identify three possibilities.144 First, is bolstering: 
The legislature may attempt to bolster its prior enactment by pro-
viding a better "demonstration" of the statute's justification. It 
may, for example, compile a more extensive investigative record, 
attempting to provide the demonstration the court requires.14s Sec-
ond, is disagreement on justification: The legislature may express its 
disagreement with the court's assessment of the adequacy of the 
already available demonstration. It may contend that the court 
failed to give proper weight to the considerations the court itself 
identified and that when those considerations are given appropriate 
weight, the enactment is demonstrably justified. Third, is disagree-
ment on democracy: The legislature may express its disagreement 
with the court's characterization of what a "free and democratic" 
society is. That is, the legislature may agree that, given the court's 
characterization of a free and democratic society, the enactment is 
indeed not demonstrably justified, but it may conclude that the 
court's characterization was erroneous. 
In all three situations, the public through its representatives has 
the opportunity to engage in a focused discussion of the characteris-
tics of a free and democratic society. On this account, section 33 
allows judicial review to coexist with majoritarian decisionmaking 
142. See, e.g., Regina v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 129 (Can.). 
143. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms},§ 1. 
144. A fourth possibility is that the legislature disagrees with the court's determination of 
what constitutes a guaranteed right or freedom. 
145. One might wonder whether a legislature pursuing this course would actually have to 
invoke § 33. If the enhanced demonstration succeeds, the new statute would survive judicial 
review. The legislature might prefer to avoid the cost of relitigation by invoking § 33 under 
these circumstances, although presumably the proposal's opponents would use its supporters' 
reluctance to subject their enhanced "demonstration" to judicial scrutiny as another ground 
for criticism. 
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in a way that contributes to enhancing the public's understanding of 
democratic values and constitutional norms. 
In addition, the mere existence of the section 33 power may 
strengthen judicial review .146 Michael Mandel, a severe critic of the 
Charter on the ground that it puts into legal form - and into the 
hands of lawyers - controversies that ought to be handled openly 
through politics, reported the comments of the clause's critics who 
begrudgingly acknowledged that "governments can be 'thrown out' 
for exercising" their powers under the clause and that invoking the 
clause "will be a red flag for opposition parties and the press . . . 
[which] will make it difficult for government to override the Char-
ter."147 Or, as phrased more generously by John Whyte, it "means, 
first, that what were once political problems have been transformed 
into legal problems but, second, that when political interests are 
sufficiently compelling these issues can revert to being resolved 
through political choice."148 
A Charter enthusiast, in contrast, pointed out that the process 
has two faces. "It is probably true," according to Dale Gibson, 
"that a government would be taking a considerable political risk by 
introducing, in normal circumstances," overriding legislation, but 
the existence of the clause, particularly when it is interpreted nar-
rowly, might strengthen judicial review by alleviating judicial con-
cern about acting contrary to majority views. "[J]udges may safely 
assume .... that their vigilance will not frustrate the democratic pro-
cess,"149 and they might therefore invalidate legislation more read-
ily than they would if they knew that the only response available to 
the public was a constitutional amendment.1so For one who ad-
mires the political process but who thinks that some rights deserve 
greater protection than they are likely to get in ordinary politics, 
section 33 might seem to be a useful way of setting in motion an 
146. This argument was suggested to me by passages in Weinrib, supra note 135, espe-
cially at 567-69, although she does not make it in precisely these terms. 
147. MANDEL, supra note 12, at 76 (citations omitted). 
148. Whyte, supra note 140, at 351. 
149. GmsoN, supra note 126, at 125-26. 
150. Conceivably, § 33 might lead judges to invalidate legislation less frequently than 
they would in its absence. Judges might fear public repudiation of their views, perhaps be-
cause it would cast them in a bad light. It is not clear to me why judges would have that 
reaction to an override, which they could equally well see as an exercise of a constitutional 
power on par with their own. In the Canadian context, those who criticized § 33 as incompat-
ible with judicial review did not invoke this concern but focused instead on the more obvious 
points that § 33 allowed the same majority that enacted a statute to override a judicial deci-
sion finding it unconstitutional and that such a process was not what most people thought was 
meant by constitutionally entrenched rights. 
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extraordinary sort of majoritarian politics in which the claims of the 
community and the claims of rights would both get their due. 
Suppose a court invalidates a statute, and a legislative effort to 
override the decision fails. That might occur for a number of rea-
sons, but prominent among them are likely to be three: (1) that a 
substantial number of people agree with the court's interpretation 
of the Charter; (2) that a substantial number of people agree that 
the court's decision is more acceptable than either the statute inval-
idated or any alternative statute that might take its place; and (3) 
that a substantial number of people accept a norm of political be-
havior according to which court decisions should be repudiated 
only if the decisions are egregiously wrong.151 The political culture 
then can take the failure to override as an indication of popular 
support for the court decision. To adapt a phrase from Thomas 
Reed Powell, the failure to invoke section 33 is a way in which the 
people can be "silently vocal";152 their inaction demonstrates their 
agreement with the court's decision. Without the section 33 power, 
the people have no way to express that agreement.153 
Section 33 thus appears to offer a method of creating a system 
of more-than-minimal judicial review while eliminating or reducing 
the problem of democratic debilitation. Section 33, on this account, 
might actually invigorate majoritarian politics by providing the peo-
ple and their representatives with a way of engaging in direct dis-
cussion of constitutional values in the ordinary course of legislation. 
151. Peter Russell observes that after the Canadian Supreme Court invalidated the na-
tion's criminal prohibitions on abortion, "the aroused and losing group went immediately to 
the parliamentary lobby to press for legislative redress" but that there was no "inclination on 
the part of the politicians to use the override." Peter H. Russell, Canadian Constraints on 
Judicialization from Without, 15 INTI.. Por.. Scr. REv. 165, 171 (1994). Instead, the govern-
ment proposed to amend the abortion statutes in a manner it contended would make them 
consistent with the court's decision. It was not able to muster sufficient support for the new 
statute, however, and the court decision stood unmodified. See infra text accompanying note 
188. 
152. Thomas Reed Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED 
EssAYS ON CoNSTITUilONAL LAw 931, 932 {Maurice H. Merrill et al. eds., 1938), quoted in 
LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUilONAL CHOICES 34 {1985). 
153. Except by refusing to amend the constitution, as happened in the flag-burning epi-
sode. Where, as in the United States, constitutional amendments require supermajority sup-
port, the inference from the people's "silence" is weaker than it would be where a simple 
majority could reject the court's position. The proposed flag-burning amendment received 
more than a majority in the House of Representatives but failed because it did not receive 
the required two-thirds support. The vote was 254 in favor, 177 against. Strikingly, however, 
even the vote five days later in the Senate could not keep the amendment process on track; 
there too the proposed amendment failed to gain the required margin, with 58 Senators in 
favor and 42 against. See Robert Justin Goldstein, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An His-
torical, Political, and Legal Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 19, 29 (1990). Under these circum-
stances, perhaps the fact that more than 40 Senators voted against the proposed amendment 
should carry somewhat more weight than it would had the vote been legally consequential. 
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B. A U.S. Analogue to Section 33 
Although Michael Perry offers section 33 as a "Canadian inno-
vation,"154 the present U.S. Constitution has provisions that might 
have operated like section 33.155 These are the provisions authoriz-
ing Congress to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court.156 Broadly interpreted, these provisions 
might foreclose judicial consideration of constitutional challenges 
to legislation, just as section· 33 does. As is well understood, how-
ever, the power to regulate jurisdiction has never served as a signifi-
cant limit on the power of judicial review. The reasons may shed 
some light on the distinctiveness of U.S. constitutionalism, as well 
as on the problem of democratic debilitation. 
Structurally, the power to regulate jurisdiction differs from the 
section 33 power in several ways. When used, the power to regulate 
jurisdiction has no necessary time limit. In Canada the majority can 
check the use of section 33 because a government must stand for 
election before a notwithstanding statute expires. It is essentially 
impossible to have such a check on the power to regulate jurisdic-
tion in the United States because terms in the U.S. Senate are 
staggered. 
In addition, only Congress can exercise the power to regulate 
jurisdiction, and it can regulate only the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.157 That creates enormous difficulties in enacting a provision 
that truly insulates a statute from constitutional challenge in some 
courts. One can devise interpretations of the power to regulate ju-
risdiction that might allow Congress to enact such provisions, but a 
recalcitrant Supreme Court could develop at least equally plausible 
interpretations that make doing so quite difficult.158 Of course, if 
154. Perry, supra note 5, at 156. 
155. See Weiler, supra note 125, at 84 n.104. 
156. See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative 
Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States, 
1990 DuKE LJ. 1229, 1286-91. Massey collects and describes much of the extensive litera-
ture on Congress's power to regulate jurisdiction. 
157. Massey suggests that the United States has a version of a "state override" power to 
the extent that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution's substantive provisions in 
light of what states have done. Id. at 1273-84; see e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (relying in part on state enactment of death penalty statutes after Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), as justification for upholding the new death penalty statutes). 
The Court in these cases interpreted the Constitution to permit the state's actions, however; 
the states do not, at least in theory, make their laws effective notwithstanding the fact that 
they violate substantive constitutional provisions. 
158. The arguments are familiar from the literature, and I merely list them here. 
(1) Drafting a statute that a recalcitrant court cannot interpret as continuing to authorize 
judicial review is quite difficult. See, e.g., Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972). 
(2) Eliminating federal judicial consideration of a constitutional question preserves the possi-
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the Supreme Court is not recalcitrant, it is unclear why one needs to 
restrict its jurisdiction. In contrast, a Canadian legislature desiring 
to insulate its actions from judicial scrutiny merely has to utter the 
words contained in section 33. 
The simplicity of section 33 has another advantage if it is to be 
an effective device for overcoming the problem of democratic 
debilitation. Every Canadian can readily understand what section 
33 means and what it means for a legislature to invoke it. It is in 
that sense transparent. The power to regulate jurisdiction, in con-
trast, is opaque.1s9 No one knows what it really means, and using it 
to insulate legislation from judicial review seems anticonstitutional 
in some deep sense. 
Finally, section 33 was constitutionally significant in a way that 
the power to regulate jurisdiction is not. The insertion of section 33 
into the Charter was an essential condition for its adoption, and, 
again, politically aware Canadians knew that it was so. Invoking it 
could not therefore be anticonstitutional.160 At least to today's 
public, the power to regulate jurisdiction is an obscure, technical 
part of the Constitution. Using it to accomplish a politically signifi-
bility of state judicial consideration. State courts may take the Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement as authoritative, thereby "freezing" the law in a manner contrary to the aims 
of those who restricted federal court jurisdiction. Even if some state courts do not take the 
law as frozen, some may reach the same conclusion the Supreme Court did, thereby reducing 
the political benefit of restricting federal jurisdiction. (3) In some contexts, legislators find it 
convenient to seek judicial assistance in enforcing their enactments. It is unclear whether 
Congress can ask the courts' assistance while denying them the authority to consider consti-
tutional questions that arise from the exercise of judicial power. This problem is most acutely 
presented, of course, where Congress enacts an arguably unconstitutional criminal law. The 
preceding "state court" problem arises here as well. (4) If Congress attempts to get around 
the preceding problem by authorizing detention without judicial assistance and then attempts 
to insulate that detention from judicial review, a serious problem under the Suspension 
Clause obviously arises. (5) Some jurisdiction-regulating statutes may violate other constitu-
tional provisions. All are vulnerable to challenges that they create a regime in which certain 
constitutional rights are treated unequally, which can with some difficulty be developed into 
an argument against their constitutionality on equality grounds. 
None of the arguments against the constitutionality of restricting judicial review are unan-
swerable, though some are stronger than others. They do show, however, that enacting an 
effective restriction on judicial review by regulating jurisdiction is not easily accomplished. 
159. Cf. Weiler, supra note 125, at 84 n.104 (calling the power to regulate jurisdiction "an 
even cruder and less suitable instrument than formal amendment" because Congress need 
not "address, squarely and deliberately, an issue of constitutional policy" when using that 
power). 
160. An analogy might be the constitutional provision barring Congress from regulating 
the importation of slaves before 1808, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. As an essential condition 
for the adoption of the Constitution, that provision was a definitive answer to anyone who 
might have tried to invoke Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce in support of a 
ban on importing slaves before 1808. 
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cant end, like insulating controversial legislation from judicial re-
view, would be a sophistical manipulation of words.161 
C. Applying and Interpreting Section 33 
As legislation and litigation proceeded under the Charter, sec-
tion 33 did not overcome the problem of democratic debilitation in 
a system with vigorous judicial review. Tue retrospective interpre-
tation, which, as I have argued, would have served to focus public 
debate on the invalidated policy and potential legislative override, 
was the first element of the limited interpretation to go. A lower 
court held that the Charter's guarantee of freedom of association 
protected the right of public employees to engage in a strike.162 
Before the country's highest court had expressed its view on that 
question,163 the Saskatchewan government enacted a back-to-work 
law ending a strike and used section 33 to insulate the law from 
judicial review. According to Mandel, the government suffered no 
adverse political consequences from using section 33 in this pro-
spective manner.164 
Tue reaction of the Quebec legislature, however, posed a more 
serious threat to the narrow interpretation of the clause. Nine 
weeks after the Charter was proclaimed, the Quebec parliament en-
acted a general "notwithstanding" statute. The technique was 
ingenious. Tue legislature repealed every statute in force and im-
mediately reenacted every one, along with a statute that invoked 
section 33 with respect to them all and indeed with respect to all 
statutes that it would thereafter adopt. Tue validity of this ap-
proach to section 33 came before the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General). 165 
Tue case involved one of the province's more sweeping attempts 
to preserve its Francophone cultural identity: a statute, known 
161. I should note, however, that the visible role of § 33 in the Charter's adoption has 
some drawbacks. Some Canadians viewed it as a raw political deal, fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the point of the Charter. MANDEL, supra note 12, at 75-76. For such critics, invok-
ing it in significant cases would merely confirm their judgment that the Charter was fatally 
flawed by § 33. 
162. Saskatchewan v. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, [1987] 1S.C.R.460 (Can.). 
163. The Canadian Supreme court ultimately rejected the lower court's interpretation of 
the Charter. Saskatchewan v. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 
(Can.); Public Serv. Alliance v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (Can.); In re Public Serv. 
Employee Rel. Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (Can.). 
164. See MANDEL, supra note 12, at 77. Whyte, supra note 140, at 354, treats this as an 
example rather than an evasion of the retrospective interpretation, which he defines as deal-
ing with "situations in which a court has already struck down the legislative provision that is 
being granted legislative immunity." 
165. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.). 
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throughout the litigation as Bill 101, requiring that all public signs 
and commercial advertising in the province be only in French. The 
Quebec legislature included an override provision in the statute 
when it was reenacted after the Charter's adoption. Businesses that 
wanted to post signs in French and English challenged the statute; 
Ford, the lead appellant in the Canadian Supreme Court case, ran a 
shop in which she sold wool and was told that she had to take down 
her sign that said "Laine - Wool" because it violated the statute. 
The challenge rested on Charter provisions guaranteeing the right 
of free expression, but such a provision would be unavailing if the 
override provision was upheld. 
The plaintiff businesses argued that the override provision "did 
not sufficiently specify the guaranteed rights or freedoms which the 
legislation intended to override."166 Like other "clear statement" 
arguments, this one ultimately rested on the idea that when a legis-
lature does something as serious as overriding otherwise applicable 
constitutional protections, it ought to follow procedures that are 
sufficient to bring into public view precisely what is at stake. In that 
way, the argument goes, the constitutional protections will be over-
ridden only after the public duly considers precisely what is at 
stake. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, rejected this argu-
ment, saying that section 33 "lays down requirements of form 
only."167 The court said that requiring the statute to specify the 
constitutional provisions to be overridden would amount to a sub-
stantive requirement. It suggested that requiring specificity would 
be unreasonable in situations, likely to be common, where the legis-
lature could not reasonably be expected to anticipate which of the 
Charter's many provisions might be invoked to challenge its 
statute.16s 
Because of some procedural aspects of the case that are irrele-
vant to my discussion here, 169 the court went on to hold that the 
166. [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 737. 
167. [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 740; see Weinrib, supra note 135, at 551 ("The judgment offers 
little reasoning for these conclusions."). It may be that the decision reflects the gravitational 
pull of traditional ideas of parliamentary supremacy. 
168. Indeed, one might add, a legislature that specified the provisions to be overridden 
might fear that a court unsympathetic to its statute on the merits would inflate an otherwise 
frivolous - but not overridden - constitutional challenge into a decision against the legisla-
tion. In addition, the court might have suggested that to the extent that it adopted a rule 
saying that the provisions to be overridden had to be identified with sufficient specificity, the 
decision of whether a "notwithstanding" statute was "sufficiently" specific would inevitably 
have a substantive component. 
169. The court held that the sign law violated § 3 of the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms, which states that "[e]very person is the possessor of the fundamental 
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sign law did indeed violate constitutional guarantee of free expres-
sion: freedom to use one's language was encompassed by the guar-
antee of free expression.110 The court's analysis made it clear that 
the sign law would be unconstitutional under the Charter once the 
override's five-year term expired in February 1989,171 less than two 
months from the date the Ford decision was announced. Three 
days after the Ford decision was announced, Quebec premier 
Robert Bourassa announced his government's intention to intro-
duce a new sign law tb,at would incorporate a notwithstanding 
provision.172 
The Canadian Supreme Court's decision would appear to be in-
consistent with one part of the political account of section 33 that I 
have offered, under which the point of the clause is to make it polit-
ically costly to override constitutional protections. Under the Ford 
decision, rather routine and indeed quite unfocused "notwithstand-
ing" statutes satisfy the requirements of section 33. At this point, 
though, it is important to distinguish between the political costs of 
using the section 33 power and the political costs of adopting the 
substantive legislation. Even without constitutional protections of 
entrenched rights, some legislative proposals will be controversial 
on the merits because they infringe on the values that entrenched 
freedoms, including freedom of conscience ... [and] freedom of expression." R.S.Q., ch. 
C-12, § 3 (1988) (Can.). The parallel provision of the Canadian Charter provides that "every-
one has the following fundamental freedoms: ... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression .... " CAN. CoNST. (Constitution Act, 1982) Pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), § 2(B). An override provision did not protect the sign law against the provi-
sions of the Quebec Charter. 
170. In light of the interpretation of§ 33, with which the opinion opened, the only effect 
of the decision on the merits was to make it quite clear that otherwise valuable rights were 
indeed being overridden, a proposition that probably needed no support anyway. A scholar 
of U.S. constitutional law can hardly avoid hearing echoes of John Marshall's "split the differ-
ence" strategy in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), here. The Canadian Supreme 
Court managed to say that the Quebec legislature had denied rights that many believe to be 
fundamental, without actually confronting the legislature with a decision to which it had to 
respond. 
171. See e.g., Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 767 (interpreting the relevant portions of the Que-
bec and Canadian Charters in tandem), 768-71 (interpreting similarly as to provisions dealing 
with permissible justifications for infringing guaranteed rights). 
172. A new override was needed because the general override had expired at the end of 
its five-year term. Bourassa's liberal government, unlike its separatist predecessor, was not 
inclined to continue its predecessor's general opposition to the Charter. 
The new law, Bill 178, was somewhat less restrictive than Bill 101. It allowed the use of 
English in interior signs but continued to prohibit its use on exterior signs. Bourassa may 
have believed that this new proposal would avoid the constitutional problems the Supreme 
Court had found with Bill 101. See Stephane Dion, Explaining Quebec Nationalism, in THE 
COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 77, 93-94 (R. Kent Weaver ed., 1992) (suggesting that Bourassa 
believed Bill 178 to be an acceptable compromise). If so, he would have been invoking§ 33 
to "bolster" an enactment rather than to disagree with either the court's assessment of justifi-
cation or its concept of democracy. 
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rights would protect if the system had such rights.173 If we add en-
trenched rights and the override power to the system, the same con-
troversies will arise on the merits. The argument for section 33 is 
that legislatures will incur some special costs, beyond those associ-
ated with adopting controversial legislation, when they use their 
power to override constitutional protections. Anglophones in Que-
bec and elsewhere in Canada objected to the sign law on the merits; 
indeed, three anglophone members of the Quebec government re-
signed to protest the new law.174 The degree to which the protests 
were directed at section 33's invocation, as opposed to the statute's 
substance, though, is unclear. 
Does the Ford interpretation of section 33 undermine the argu-
ment that special political costs will attend the invocation of an 
override? Perhaps it does. A provincial legislature is unlikely to 
incur serious marginal costs within the province for using its section 
33 power because it can do so with the ordinary low-level public 
attention that occurs in connection with every statute.11s Overrid-
ing court decisions may have been particularly easy in Quebec, 
which had its own judicially enforceable bill of rights nearly 
equivalent to the Charter. The people of Quebec thus could get 
almost all of the benefits of a bill of rights without feeling that one 
had been imposed on them from the outside. 
Outside the province, however, the situation differed. Quebec's 
expansive use of the notwithstanding clause did draw public atten-
tion to the significance of overriding constitutional protections. It 
was not the Quebec public that noticed, though; it was the public in 
the rest of Canada. 
Here the political context of the Ford litigation plays a central 
role.176 As the Ford litigation proceeded through the courts, the 
Canadian national government attempted to reach a new accommo-
dation with Quebec in what was known as the Meech Lake Accord, 
173. So, for example, free speech considerations can be invoked in the British Parliament 
as a ground for opposing a proposal, even though Great Britain lacks entrenched protection 
for free speech. 
174. Quebec Signs Ruling Sparks Furor, Facts on File World News Digest, Dec. 23, 1988, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World File. 
175. Even so, Bourassa did suffer some defections - the resignation of three cabinet 
ministers - because he introduced the new sign bill that included a § 33 override. MAN· 
FREDI, supra note 130, at 202. 
176. One observer regretted Quebec's blanket use of the override power while noting 
that it reflected the province's disagreements with the Charter as a whole. The sign-law con-
troversy encapsulated the cultural, political, and therefore constitutional differences between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada; the blanket override was only a symptom. William Black, A 
Walk Through the Charter, in RIGHTING TIIE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW EQUALITY RIOHTS 
69 (Lynn Smith et al. eds., 1986). 
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the key - though in many ways largely symbolic - provision of 
which would have embedded in the Canadian constitution the state-
ment that Quebec "constitutes within Canada a distinct society."177 
By the time of the Ford decision, the national government, Que-
bec's legislature, and all but two provincial parliaments had agreed 
to the Accord's provisions. 
Some thought that under the "distinct society" clause, Quebec's 
sign law would be constitutional without regard to the section 33 
power.178 Under these circumstances, Quebec's use of a blanket 
override power, even if permissible under Ford, somehow seemed 
like a dirty pool. To those elsewhere in Canada who already had 
misgivings about the Meech Lake Accord, the override was just an-
other example of Quebec's overreaching.179 The Ford decision and 
Bourassa's response affirmed that concern, and "from this point on 
'there was virtually no chance that the Meech Lake Accord would 
be ratified.' "180 
The Canadian provinces failed to adopt the Meech Lake Accord 
for many reasons,181 but one was surely that people elsewhere in 
177. Meech Lake Accord,§ 2(1)(b), reprinted in PETER W. HoGG, MEECH LAKE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AccoRD ANNOTATED 11 (1988). According to one annotation, this provision 
neither confers power nor denies power. It will be relevant only where other constitu-
tional provisions are unclear or ambiguous, and where reference to the ideas of linguistic 
duality or distinct society would help to clarify the meaning. It is difficult to identify 
constitutional provisions that are unclear or ambiguous in that way. Subsection (1) 
should probably be seen as an affirmation of sociological facts with little legal 
significance. 
HOGG, supra at 12; see also Roderick A. Macdonald, . . . Meech Lake to the Contrary 
Notwithstanding (Part I), 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 253, 272-73 (1991) (describing but not en-
dorsing this interpretation of the "distinct society" clause). 
178. See KATHERINE E. SWINTON, THE SUPREME COURT AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM: 
THE LASKIN-DICKSON YEARS 353 (1990) ("The best interpretation of the distinct society 
clause is that it would not ... 'trump' section 1, but work with it - that is, Quebec's limita-
tions on rights would have to be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, 
albeit one that is distinct culturally and linguistically."); Macdonald, supra note 177, at 274 
(citing "Bourassa's own peculiar statement •.. that, if the Meech Lake Accord had already 
been ratified, the Quebec government would not have needed to invoke the notwithstanding 
clause"). 
179. The day after Bourassa presented the new sign bill, the Premier of Manitoba, one of 
the two provinces that had not ratified the Meech Lake Accord, declared that he would not 
push for the Accord's ratification (with the three-year time limit quite near) "until Quebec 
changed its language policy." Quebec Signs Ruling Sparks Furor, supra note 174, at 957D3. 
180. Russell, supra note 151, at 167 (quoting PATRICK MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE 
INSIDE STORY 164 (1991)). 
181. For an overview of the failure, see SWINTON, supra note 178, at 350-52, and Patrick J. 
Monahan, After Meech Lake: An Insider's View, 22 OrrAWA L. REv. 317, 326-54 (1990). 
The requirements for amending the Charter as the Meech Lake Accord would have were 
stringent: every provincial legislature was required to ratify the amendments within a three-
year period. See Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic 
Separatism and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 250 n.141 (1992) (describing the amend-
ment requirements). As Monahan argues, the unanimity requirement and the time limit ex-
acerbated the bargaining situation in which the politicians found themselves: each province 
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Canada thought Quebec was pushing too hard for special rights. To 
the extent that its legislature's use of a blanket override was incon-
sistent with the expectations about how the power to override 
would be used, as expressed in the debates over the Charter's adop-
tion, Quebec may indeed have incurred a distinctive political cost 
attributable to its use of override power, independent of the costs 
incurred by adopting the sign law itself. According to one observer, 
the invocation of section 33 "undermined political support for the 
Meech Lake Accord outside Quebec, dealing a fatal blow to its 
chances for ratification. "182 
D. Section 33 and Other Responses to the Problem of 
Democratic Debilitation 
Perhaps the outcome of the experience with section 33 was pre-
dictable, as positive political theory might suggest.183 Consider the 
sequence of decisions in constitutional adjudication. (1) A legisla-
ture adopts a statute by a majority vote. (2) A court decides that 
the statute is unconstitutional. (3) Some process - constitutional 
amendment or a section 33 override - is available to override the 
court decision. If the decision-rule at stage 3 is no different from 
the decision-rule at stage 1 and - importantly - if there are no 
changes in preferences in the legislature between stage 1 and stage 
3, we should expect that at the end of the day, the statute will be in 
effect; the same majority that enacted the statute in the first place 
will override the court's decision.184 
had a veto, which meant that each could insist on linking otherwise unrelated issues; the time 
limit placed a premium on delay, in the hope that an intervening provincial election would 
lead at least one province to refuse to ratify. Further, the Accord was negotiated in secrecy 
and under severe pressure from then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. See B. Jamie Cam-
eron, An Outside View of Meech Lake: The Inside Story, 2 SUP. CT. L. REV. 545, 549 (1991) 
(reviewing PATRICK J. MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE INSIDE STORY {1991)) ("Prime Minis-
ter Mulroney held the ten premiers 'hostage' for almost a week until agreement to ratify the 
Accord was reached."). The process itself diminished the public's willingness to accept the 
Accord. 
182. MANFREDI, supra note 130, at 202. This may however refer to the use of § 33 with 
respect to the sign law, not the blanket override. 
183. For expositions of positive political theory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Fere-
john, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 477 {1992); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. 
Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 263 {1992); 
and McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 80 GEo. L.J. 705 {1992). These articles develop a positive theory of statutory interpreta-
tion that is more complex than the one needed here. 
184. Indeed, there may be reason to think that the vote for a § 33 override might ordinar-
ily be larger than the original vote: some legislators might be willing to vote for a statute with 
a guaranteed expiration date but not for one of indefinite duration. 
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In contrast, if repudiating a judicial decision requires more than 
a majority, we can expect that some statutes that received a major-
ity vote would not survive the supermajority requirement. The U.S. 
experience with anti-flag-burning statutes seems an obvious exam-
ple. Substantial majorities in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate voted for the Flag Protection Act of 1989. A propo-
sal to amend the Constitution to override the Supreme Court's in-
validation of the Act secured more than a majority but less than the 
required two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives.18s 
On closer examination, the flag-burning episode illuminates the 
Canadian experience as well. After the Supreme Court's first flag-
burning decision, the Republican administration proposed, not a 
new statute, but a constitutional amendment.186 The Democratic 
congressional leadership did not want to put the amendment to a 
vote and proposed a new statute as an alternative, holding out the 
possibility of a vote on an amendment if that proved necessary. 
Most observers believed that the Democratic leadership opposed a 
constitutional amendment but feared that, in the heat of the mo-
ment, it might receive the required supermajority. Apparently, the 
leadership hoped that by the time the Supreme Court rejected their 
proposed statute, if it did, passions would have cooled and the legis-
lature would not adopt a constitutional amendment. 
Why would the passage of time matter so much, though? Simi-
larly, how could proponents of section 33 believe that it could make 
a difference in outcomes, given that a majority could enact a statute 
overriding a court decision? The answer is obvious: in both situa-
tions, proponents hoped that preferences would change between 
stage 1 and stage 3. 
In the flag-burning episode, the preference change might have 
occurred indirectly. The Democratic leadership may have thought 
that some representatives and senators would vote for a constitu-
tional amendment, not because they believed it wise constitutional 
policy, but because they feared retaliation at the polls. As time 
passes, the voters' views about the desirability of a flag-burning 
amendment might not change, but its importance relative to other 
issues might decline. A voter who thought in 1990 that, taking 
everything into account - including a candidate's vote against a 
flag-burning amendment - he should vote against the candidate, 
might decide in 1992 that the candidate's stance on other issues was 
185. See supra note 153. 
186. ROBERT S. GOLDSTEIN, SAVING "OLD GLORY": THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY 205 (1995). 
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enough to justify a vote for her, even though the voter continued to 
believe that the candidate's vote against a constitutional amend-
ment was wrong.1s1 
There is another source of preference change worth noting, the 
court decision itself. Certainly proponents of section 33 believed 
that a court decision might educate the public in constitutional val-
ues, persuading some who supported the statute that it was indeed 
inconsistent with their commitment to more fundamental values. 
Similarly, in the flag-burning episode, the Democratic leadership 
may have hoped that passions would cool, not in the sense that 
other issues would displace flag burning, but rather in the sense that 
the public would reflect on the values of speech and nationhood at 
stake and would conclude that their sense of national unity could be 
sustained without infringing so severely on the values promoted by 
the First Amendment. Here the change in preferences between 
stage 1 and stage 3 occurs because of what happens at stage 2.188 
There are, of course, other techniques of educating the public. 
Scholars in the United States, for example, have written of the 
Supreme Court's educative role.189 One might be skeptical of how 
effective the Supreme Court's lessons can be, however, when the 
public has no choice but to go along with the Court's decisions un-
less they can mobilize the special majority required to amend the 
Constitution. Proponents of section 33 might have believed, in con-
trast, that public knowledge that ordinary majorities could override 
courts' decisions would enhance the educational effect of their 
decisions. 
Alexander Bickel argued that some of the techniques he identi-
fied as the "passive virtues" could be used to educate the public.190 
187. I am not sure that this should be described by the simple term preference change 
because neither the voter's preference nor the representative-candidate's preference on the 
issue of adopting a flag-burning amendment has changed; the voter continues to want an 
amendment, and the representative-candidate continues to oppose an amendment. The phe-
nomenon, I believe, arises from the fact that in a system of representative democracy, voters 
are presented with choices between packages of policies, embodied in competing candidates, 
and they must decide which is the most attractive package, in circumstances where it is un-
likely that any candidate will offer a package containing all and only those policies the voter 
prefers. 
188. This account of § 33 provides additional support for what I have called the retro-
spective interpretation of the notwithstanding clause. See supra text accompanying notes 
135-39. 
189. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican School-
master, 1967 SuP. Cr. REv. 127. For my views on this proposition, see Mark Tushnet, Style 
and the Supreme Court's Educational Role in Government, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 215 
(1994). 
190. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-13. 
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So, for example, the Court could invoke notions of desuetude to 
put to today's public the question of whether it wished to continue 
to enforce a statute that seemed to the Court inconsistent with con-
temporary values. It could also construe statutes to avoid constitu-
tional doubts, again to put to the public the question of whether it 
truly believed that the purposes the statute served were so impor-
tant that trenching on constitutional values was justified.191 
Perhaps the language issue in Quebec was so important that 
even an endogenous preference change induced by the Canadian 
Supreme Court's decision invalidating the sign law could not shift 
enough votes to prevent enactment of a statute overriding the deci-
sion.192 Or, perhaps, the ability of a constitutional court to educate 
is smaller than proponents of section 33 and other techniques of 
public education through judicial decision have hoped.193 
E. Conclusion: Institutional Innovation and More-Than-Minimal 
Judicial Review 
The story of the Canadian constitution continues to unfold and 
the precise arrangements that Quebec and what I have so far called 
the rest of Canada - but which might end up being called Canada 
tout court - will reach remain to be determined. After the Meech 
Lake Accord failed, Canada's prime minister attempted to blame 
its failure not on Quebec but on section 33 itself, the "fatal flaw of 
191. Id. at 143-56, 181-83. 
192. The U.S. Department of State implicitly criticized the sign law in its 1993 Human 
Rights Report, Department of State Dispatch (Feb. 1994) (including reference to the law in 
the section on "respect for civil liberties," which enumerates arguable violations of human 
rights). On March 31, 1993, the United Nations adopted the critical views of the sign law 
expressed by its Human Rights Committee, which found the law to violate guarantees of free 
expression. The Committee requested information within six months on "any relevant meas-
ures" taken in connection with the Committee's views. See Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 91, U.N. Doc. 
A/48/40 (1993). The override provision of Bourassa's sign law expired in 1993, and a new 
sign law was adopted on June 18, 1993. It provides that signs may be in both French and 
English if "French is markedly predominant" and authorizes the government to promulgate 
regulations allowing signs in French only or where French need not be predominant, "in 
another language only." Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, Bill 86, 1993, 
Chapter 40, Quebec National Assembly, Second Session, 34th Legislature. 
193. For proposals aimed at least in part at improving the U.S. Supreme Court's ability to 
educate the public, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGmLE CoNSTITUTION 111-24 (1992), 
and ROBERT F. NAGEL, CoNSTITUTIONAL CuLTUREs: THE MENTAUIY AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 137-42 (1989) (referring to "the capacity of the Court's doctrines to 
serve as vehicles of communication"). 
The problem of democratic debilitation arises because constitutional norm-articulation is 
centralized in the courts rather than distributed among numerous civic institutions. Perhaps, 
then, the Canadian constitutional experience shows the impossibility of sustaining a system in 
which the power of constitutional norm-articulation is not centralized. If so, educational re-
sponses to the problem of democratic debilitation would be even more valuable. 
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1981, which reduces your individual rights and mine."194 No longer 
seen as a way of avoiding problems of democratic debilitation, sec-
tion 33 came to be seen as inconsistent with the idea of judicially 
enforceable constitutional rights. Like the power to regulate juris-
diction in the U.S. Constitution, section 33 may no longer be a sig-
nificant part of the Canadian Charter. Something like a convention 
against its use may have emerged,195 precisely because the political 
costs of invoking the power turned out to be too great. This is 
analogous to the convention in the United States against using the 
power to regulate jurisdiction to insulate significant constitutional 
issues from judicial review.196 Effectively, then, the Canadian sys-
tem may include only the possibility of amending the constitution 
by a supermajority, not the possibility of majoritarian control of 
constitutional interpretation. 
The reason for the apparent emergence of the convention in 
Canada may shed some light on broader issues of constitution mak-
ing and the problem of democratic debilitation. As one commenta-
tor put it, "Canadians experienced a use of the notwithstanding 
clause that they found outrageous before they experienced a 
Supreme Court decision of equivalent political unpopularity."197 I 
have argued that the notwithstanding power is more attractive than 
the power to regulate jurisdiction as a response to the problem of 
democratic debilitation because of its visibility and importance in 
the constitutional compromise. Yet, the political setting in which 
section 33 emerged may mean that it did not become an element of 
Canadians' constitutional consciousness at all. It was inserted into 
the Charter as part of a compromise that papered over arguably the 
most important issue in Canadian constitutional life - the status of 
Quebec.198 It was discredited, at least in part, because it was used 
in connection with precisely that issue.199 
Canada's experience with the notwithstanding clause suggests 
that institutions designed to address the problem of democratic 
debilitation by making it possible to deal with that problem visibly 
194. MANFREDI, supra note 130, at 202. 
195. ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS! THE MARRIAGE OF 
LAW AND Por.mcs 147 (1991). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 154-61. 
197. MANFREDI, supra note 130, at 204. 
198. See Weiler, supra note 125, at 54-60 (discussing the centrality of the language issue, 
particularly in Quebec, in Canada's constitutional life). Section 33 itself did not address the 
language issue because language rights are not covered by § 33, but the notwithstanding 
clause made it possible for the nation to adopt the Charter without Quebec's agreement. 
199. Ironically, it was used by a province that had refused to accede to the Charter as a 
whole. 
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may fail because of their visibility. The characteristic that makes 
the institution attractive may make it impossible to function effec-
tively. As Paul Weiler has noted, 
By taking the initiative ... before the Charter had time to put down 
roots in Quebec political life, and by making use of the non obstante 
formula a matter of legislative routine, the Parti Quebecois [which 
enacted Bill 101, the initial sign law] was able to remove the political 
hazard of invoking the formula for particular laws, thus frustrating the 
entire scheme of the Charter.200 
This "accident of history"201 in the Canadian experience actually 
may be built into the institution of a non obstante formula in the 
following way. 
Constitutions in general consist of institutional arrangements 
designed to provide a framework for the resolution of political is-
sues over the long term. The outlines of those long-term issues may 
be only dimly discerned when the constitution is adopted, and con-
stitution makers do their best to put in place institutions that will do 
the best that can be done with whatever problems arise. Simultane-
ously, however, constitution makers face ordinary political 
problems in the present day, and frequently they may have to ad-
dress those problems as a condition for securing the constitution's 
adoption. They have three strategies for dealing with such pressing 
problems. First, they may simply resolve them, adopting the kind 
of political solution already available through the use of existing 
political institutions. Second, they may relegate those problems to 
the new institutions they create, hoping that those institutions will 
do no worse in resolving them than the preexisting .institutions did. 
Third, they may defer their resolution, in the hope that time will 
make those particular problems go away. 
Consider here two provisions in the U.S. Constitution. Article 
VI, Section 1 provides for the assumption by the United States of 
debts incurred by the states during the war and confederation peri-
ods; that was an ordinary political compromise, of the first sort. Ar-
ticle I, Section 9 bars Congress from exercising its enumerated 
power over interstate and foreign commerce to prohibit "the migra-
tion or importation of such persons as any of the States now ex-
isting shall think proper to admit" until 1808 but authorizes 
Congress to impose a tax of up to $10 on each such person. This 
compromise represents the third approach. The controversy over 
congressional regulation of the interstate slave trade was deferred 
200. Weiler, supra note 125, at 90. 
201. MANFREDI, supra note 130, at 204. 
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until 1808, by which time, the Framers apparently hoped, the issue 
would have changed so that it could be resolved through ordinary 
political means. 
If the deferred issue does not change, as the slavery issue did 
not, or if it ends up not being deferred at all, as the language issue 
in Canada was not, the compromises on that issue, designed to se-
cure adoption of the constitution, may well fail. A provision like a 
notwithstanding clause makes the overall process particularly vul-
nerable in dealing with those pressing political problems that have, 
under the second approach, simply been relegated to the new insti-
tutions. Such a provision allows politicians to take the issue away 
from the new institutions, leaving them to be handled by the pro-
cess that did not resolve it in a satisfactory way before the constitu-
tional revision. 
Other problems might also prevent the use of a non obstante 
approach. Ideally, a provision like the notwithstanding clause 
would not be used until the public generally accepted the legitimacy 
of judicial review. Two problems with that ideal strategy arise, 
though. Unlike the ban on congressional action until 1808, the 
notwithstanding clause did nothing to assist the political branches in 
deferring consideration of divisive issues regarding Quebec's sta-
tus.202 That is, the strategy of deferral will work only if the political 
system collaborates in deferring the contentious issue, which would 
seem unlikely, or if the constitutional system forces its deferral. 
If, however, the use of the notwithstanding power were delayed, 
a second problem would arise. As time passes, the notwithstanding 
clause or parallel institutions designed to address the problem of 
democratic debilitation would become less visible. They would 
come to resemble the power to regulate jurisdiction, and invoking 
them might seem contrary to understandings of constitutionalism 
that would have developed during the period when these institu-
tions were not utilized. 
The preceding suggestions may be too bleak, however. In Can-
ada, the drafters of the Charter explicitly embedded ordinary poli-
tics within their fundamental constitutional arrangements, 
expecting that ordinary politics would interact with constitutional 
202. The compromise that produced § 33 necessarily allowed the provinces to invoke the 
notwithstanding power, which meant that a recalcitrant province, as Quebec was, was quite 
likely to use it quickly, compounding the problem that the clause Jacked a deferral provision. 
See id. at 205 ("In modem federal systems, sub-national governments have come to be per-
ceived as the principal threat to rights and liberties, and analysts who might be willing to 
concede the legitimacy of section 33 to respond to decisions [invalidating national legislation] 
... would not accept the legitimacy of provincial overrides."). 
November 1995] Comparative Countermajoritarian Difficulty 299 
concerns in ways that would ultimately benefit the society overall. 
In one dimension, their expectations seem to have been defeated. 
Section 33 did affect the politics of constitutional arrangements, 
though not in the way the drafters seem to have anticipated. Yet, 
the text and history of section 33 would have supported an interpre-
tation different from the one the Canadian Supreme Court gave it 
in Ford. Had the court chosen a different interpretation, the course 
of constitutional development might have been different as well.203 
In another dimension, the drafters' expectations have neither been 
fulfilled nor defeated because the ultimate constitutional settlement 
involving Quebec remains to be reached. When it is, we may be 
able to decide whether section 33 and its attempt to make ordinary 
politics and constitutional law penetrate each other did indeed ben-
efit the society. 
That examination will then raise once again Thayer's concern 
about the impact of judicial review. He may have been correct in 
believing that more-than-minimal judicial review contributed to 
democratic debilitation. That is different from establishing that 
minimal judicial review will revitalize or enhance constitutional 
consciousness among the public. For, in the presence of minimal 
judicial review, the public and its representatives may simply enact 
what they know they can get away with doing. That is not a pros-
pect that Thayer would have found encouraging. 
CoN9LusmN: MINIMAL JumcIAL REVIEW AS A RESPONSE TO 
THE PROBLEMS OF POLICY DISTORTION AND 
DEMOCRATIC DEBILITATION 
I have argued that Thayer and Bickel correctly noted the 
problems of policy distortion and democratic debilitation associated 
with judicial review. I have also argued that the contours of those 
problems are more complex than they might seem. It is not clear to 
me, for example, how often misunderstandings of judicially articu-
lated norms or bargaining breakdowns due to a judicial decision 
lead to policy distortions. My sense of how the U.S. constitutional 
system operates, though, is that the problems of policy distortion 
and democratic debilitation are serious enough at least that consti-
tutional theorizing cannot stop, as it generally has, with demonstra-
203. To an outsider, it is not obvious why the court chose the interpretation it did, 
although Bruce Ackerman has suggested in conversation that the court's decision reflected 
the lingering pull of the model of parliamentary supremacy that the Charter as a whole re-
jected but that § 33 could be understood to endorse. On this view, Ford was an interpretive 
mistake because the court failed to read § 33 in light of the rejection of the model of parlia-
mentary supremacy. 
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tions that more-than-minimal judicial review does not raise the 
problem of democratic displacement.204 
If they are problems to which a constitutional system ought to 
respond, how might it do so? Despite claims made for it, the Cana-
dian notwithstanding clause did not prove to be a means by which 
democratic discussion of constitutional norms could be promoted 
within a system also authorizing judicial review. Thayer's alterna-
tive, of course, was to give judicial review a very narrow scope. 
Minimal judicial review does, almost by definition, provide a 
wider domain within which legislators and the public have an op-
portunity to articulate constitutional norms. To the extent that they 
seize that opportunity, minimal judicial review is a successful re-
sponse to the problem of democratic debilitation. It is not an en-
tirely adequate response to the problem of policy distortion, 
however. If courts rarely invalidate statutes, they provide few focal 
points that might lead to bargaining breakdowns. But, by itself, giv-
ing judicial review a minimal scope cannot reduce misunderstand-
ing as a source of policy distortion.20s 
Experience with constitutions in other countries suggests that 
Thayer and Bickel were right in identifying problems associated 
with judicial review and not merely with the forms of U.S. constitu-
tionalism. For democratic constitutionalists, the problems Thayer 
and Bickel placed on the agenda remain serious ones, perhaps so 
204. The question of the extent to which more·than-minimal judicial review contributes 
to democratic debilitation is at bottom an empirical one. Others might describe what I have 
called debilitation as evidence of people's satisfaction with the operation of our constitutional 
system or might argue that debilitation, to the extent it exists, arises from cultural sources or 
from features of our society rather than from our constitutional structure. Here I suggest 
only that the empirical claim has some intuitive appeal. To investigate it more fully, one 
might want to examine either the experience in nations with constitutions but no judicial 
enforcement or the experience in the United States before the emergence of more-than-
minimal judicial review. For some evidence on the latter, see DONALD G. MORGAN, CON-
GRESS AND TiiE CoNsTITUTioN: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966), and David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 775 (1994). My judgment is that these materials provide some support for the propo-
sition that explicit legislative attention to constitutional norms was higher in the past than it is 
now. 
Empirical analysis is further complicated by the possibility that constitutional norms may 
be so deeply embedded that legislators never advert to them explicitly but refrain from pro-
posing Jaws that would conflict with such norms. That is the form of Herbert Wechsler's 
classic argument about the way in which Congress respects constitutional norms concerning 
federalism. See HERBERT WECHSLER, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, in PRINCIPLES, Pou-
ncs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 49 (1961); see also CHOPER, supra note 41, at 52-55, 185-88. 
For a recent skeptical examination of Wechsler's argument, see Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REv. 1485, 1503-14 (1994). 
205. Giving judicial review a minimal scope might exacerbate the legitimation problem, 
see supra note 120, the extent of which I have suggested however is not troublingly large. 
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serious that their solution - giving judicial review a minimal scope 
- deserves renewed attention.206 
206. We might also benefit from discussion of alternative institutional arrangements. See 
PERRY, supra note 124, at 201. For example, restructuring the judicial system to subject 
judges to more direct political control might alleviate the problems of policy distortion and 
especially democratic debilitation. In this connection, it may be worth noting that modern 
constitution makers seem strongly inclined to reject life tenure for judges on constitutional 
courts in favor of relatively long nonrenewable terms. Full exploration of this observation 
would of course require examination of different traditions in judicial training and selection, 
the choices made between abstract or concrete review, and the like. · 
